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ABSTRACT
Recent Developments in 
Federal-State Relations:
Selected Cases in 
Federalism
by
Michael Jam es Stamcoff
Dr. Jen y  Simich, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
An interesting moment in Supreme Court history was the rise of 
William Rehnquist to Chief Justice in 1986. Under Rehnquist, the Court 
for the first time in nearly sixty years issued decisions tha t limited 
federal power. However, were the decisions indicative of the destruction 
of cooperative federalism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 or 
merely exercises limiting the excesses of federal power? This paper 
argues the latter. Recently, the Court further cemented their belief in 
cooperative federalism, while limiting its excesses where necessary in the 
cases of Nevada Department o f Human Resources v. Hibbs (2003), 
Granholm v. Heald (2005), Gonzales v. Raich (2005), Kelo v. City o f New  
London (2005), and Gonzales v. Oregon (2006). The Granholm, Raich and 
Kelo decisions were clear cooperative federalism victories; while Hibbs 
retreated from more stringent Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment
111
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jurisprudence and Oregon recognized the limitations of the federal 
government in the realm of police powers.
IV
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
In April 1995, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lopez v. United 
States. For the first time in nearly sixty years, the Court placed a 
limitation to the exercise of federal power when utilizing the Commerce 
Clause. Critics lauded tha t it was a  clear step towards “dismantling the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1937. Lopez emboldened federal courts to 
breathe new life into clauses such as ‘privileges and imm unities’ and 
doctrines such as improper delegation that had been moribund since the 
age of Roosevelt” (Leuchtenburg 2002, 97). Other critics went so far to 
declare “it appears tha t Rehnquist and his conservative colleagues don’t 
ju s t want to tu rn  the clock back to the days before Earl Warren; they’re 
hankering, it seems, for the Articles of Confederation” (Toobin 1995, 82).
Were these predictions accurate? It is that question tha t will be 
explored herein. It is now eleven years later and the Court has had 
ample time to display whether or not Lopez truly marked the beginning of 
a  federalism revolution or simply an indication that the Court would no 
longer allow the federal government free reign.
Through the analysis of key post-Lopez Supreme Court cases that 
many proponents of the federalism revolution theory believe are
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indicative of a  radical shift, this paper will demonstrate th a t the 
Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence is not indicative of a 
federalism revolution, bu t rather a  judicial check on the excesses of 
federal power while still maintaining the core of cooperative federalism as 
most fully explained in United States v. Darby Lumber (1941) and 
Wickard v. Filbum (1942). This shall be accomplished looking solely 
through the lens of the Court.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 traces the history of 
federalism from the beginning of the republic to the ascension of William 
Rehnquist to the position of Chief Justice in 1986. Highlighted are the 
major cases tha t define the Court’s federalism interpretations. The next 
chapter details the life of Rehnquist and several decisions made during 
his tenure on the Court beginning in 1971. Furthermore, it examines 
the numerous cases of the 1990s and early 2000s tha t limited the 
exercise of federal power and whether or not the decisions radically 
altered the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 
detail five recent cases {Nevada Department o f Human Resourœs v.
Hibbs, Granholm v. Heald, Gonzales v. Raich, Kelo v. City o f New London, 
and Gonzales v. Oregon) tha t address this same issue of federalism 
jurisprudence. Lastly, Chapter 9 explains the current state of federalism 
as of the summer of 2006, exploring the jurisprudence of the justices, as 
well as whether or not the Court’s collective opinions since Lopez truly 
mark a dismantling of the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
cooperative federalism.
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CHAPTER 2
A HISTORY OF FEDERALISM 
In September 1786, a M assachusetts farmer and Revolutionaiy War 
veteran named Daniel Shays led a small group of armed men to a 
Springfield courthouse with the intent of stopping land foreclosures. The 
end of the Revolutionary War resulted in an economic “depression [that] 
left many small farmers unable to pay their debts” (Edwards et al. 2005, 
34) and thus the farmers were intent on maintaining what little they had 
left. The uprising shocked the elites who “were scared at the thought 
that people had taken the law into their own hands and violated the 
property rights of others. Neither Congress nor the state able to raise a 
militia to stop Shays and his followers and a privately paid force was 
assembled to do the job” (Edwards et al. 2005, 34). The government 
created under the Articles of Confederation was troublesome and this 
armed uprising served to solidify it. “Simply put, the Framers and the 
Founders recognized tha t the states were not the solution, and tha t state 
sovereignty was not the unalloyed blessing much of the current rhetoric 
ascribed to it. The states were, rather the primary source of the 
problems that plagued the Confederation” (Killenbeck 2002, 27). After 
an aborted attempt to deal with the problems inherent in the Article of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Confederation in Annapolis, Maryland tha t same month (representatives 
from only five states bothered to show up), it was attempted again in May 
1787. This time the convention would be held in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania and would change history.
The Constitutional Convention was attended by 12 states (Rhode 
Island did not find it significant enough) with a total of 55 
representatives. The Convention decided rather than simply amending 
the Articles of Confederation, they would instead draft a  new framework 
for government. Through constant debates, the Convention decided on 
such matters as a strong bicameral legislature, a weak executive, and an 
ambiguous judiciary. It is here, in the debates of what the government 
should look like, that the issue of federalism first arose. “Federalism is a  
way organizing a  nation so that two levels of government have formal 
authority over the same land and people” (Edwards et al. 2005, 615). 
Indeed, many of the convention’s delegates felt the majority of power 
should be vested in the states. These individuals were the Anti- 
Federalists and included such leaders as George Clinton, Jam es 
Winthrop and Robert Yates. Another group favored a  strong central 
government and as such was referred to as Federalists. The Federalist 
ranks included Jam es Madison, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton.
Both the Federalists and Anti-Federalist published a  series of articles 
defending their positions on various governmental issues. In Federalist 
No. 28, Alexander Hamilton wrote
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general 
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations 
of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition 
towards the general government. The people, by throwing 
themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If 
their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other 
as the instrum ent of redress (Publius 2003, 176-177).
Furthermore, in Federalist No. 39, Jam es Madison solidified the notion of
federalism writing “the proposed Constitution, therefore, even when
tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is in, strictness, neither
a  national nor a  federal Constitution, bu t a  composition of both” (Publius
2003, 242). Federalism was bom.
The federalism debate of the 1780s demonstrated what was and still 
is so complicated about the subject. Its two central questions are “How 
was federalism possible in theory? and How would it work in practice” 
(Rakove 1996, 188)? The fear of Anti-Federalists rested on the notion of 
imperium in imperio tha t stated “two sovereign authorities could not 
coexist in one polity; one or the other had to be supreme; and because 
power itself was dynamic, the loser in the competition m ust expect its 
authority to continue to atrophy” (Rakove 1996, 182). Thus, the issue of 
federalism will always be problematic since there is a  constant struggle 
between the nation and states. The issue becomes even more 
problematic since there is not a  concrete way to determine how 
federalism would exist in practice. Only time would tell. Taken together, 
these factors indicated that federalism was an issue that would 
consistently trouble the nation.
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The Federalists were largely successful in achieving their aims. 
However, the Anti-Federalists insisted on a series of am endm ents 
protecting individual rights and liberties. These were tacked onto the 
Constitution as opposed to incorporated since the Constitution is simply 
a blueprint for how the government should be structured. Among the 
ten amendments, soon to be cedled the Bill of Rights, was the Tenth 
Amendment.
Amendment X: The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States, respectively, or to the people.
Indeed, “by dividing political authority and sovereignty between the
national government and the states, federalism provides a  structural
check on national power, protecting not only states' rights bu t individual
rights” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 53). Thus, the idea of federalism was
firmly planted into American government. However, how would the
newly established Supreme Court of the United States interpret this
idea?
The Marshall Court (1801-1835)
McCullochv. Maryland (1819)
No case captures the essence of the Marshall Court’s interpretation of 
federalism than McCulloch v. Maryland. During the Constitutional 
Convention, the idea of a National Bank arose; however, it was not given 
much discussion. During George Washington’s first-term as president.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton was “asked to prepare a  
report on creating a national bank” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 55) by the 
House of Representatives. It narrowly passed Congressional approval 
and Washington signed the bank bill into law in 1791.
The Bank was rechartered in 1816. It was the so-called Era of Good 
Feelings in the United States, however, that would quickly change. “Late 
in 1818 the Second Bank of the United States ordered state banks to 
demand repayment of all loans. It also required state banks to exchange 
their notes for gold and silver. Few banks could do this. The result was 
the Panic of 1819...[and] the nation quickly sank into an economic 
depression tha t lasted several years” (Boyer 2003, 237). Furthermore, 
“because of inefficiency and corruption, the bank was very unpopular, 
and many blamed it for the nation’s problems” (Epstein and Walker 
2004, 327). Thus, in 1818, the state of Maryland passed a  law “taxing 
the national bank’s Baltimore branch $15,000 a  yeair. The Baltimore 
branch refused to pay, whereupon the state of Maryland sued the 
cashier, Jam es McCulloch, for payment” (Edwards et al. 2005, 74). After 
the Maryland state courts upheld their legislature’s decision, it was 
appealed to Marshall’s court.
In the landmark decision, Marshall “embraced an expansive view of 
Congress’ powers” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 56). The three areas of 
constitutional law it addressed were the Tenth Amendment, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause.
8
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As it pertains to the Tenth Amendment, Marshall, writing the Court’s 
opinion, stated
Even the 10^ Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of 
quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the 
word “expressly,” and declares only that the power “not delegated 
to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to 
the states or to the people,” thus leaving the question, whether 
particular power which may become the subject of contest has 
been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other, 
to depend on a  fair construction of the whole instrum ent (17 U.S. 
316).
Thus, since the Constitution did not specifically mention the bank, it 
does not necessarily exclude Congress from creating it. This is because 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Necessary and Proper Clause is found in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution and states Congress possesses the power “to make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
forgoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department of Office thereof” 
(Berman and Murphy, 2000). According to Marshall’s opinion (a 6-0 
opinion)
Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing 
a bank or creating a  corporation. But there is no phrase in the 
instrum ent which, like the articles of confederation, excludes 
incident or implied powers; and which requires that everything 
granted shall be expressly and minutely described (17 U.S. 316).
Thus, Congress does have the constitutional right to establish a bank
despite no direct mention. This proved to be an extremely wide
interpretation of implied powers and in fact “this was indeed the broadest
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
possible definition of national power...This ruling created the potential 
for the national government to expand its powers into many areas tha t 
had previously been thought to be reserved to the states (Berman and 
Murphy 2000, 106). However, regarding the issue of states taxing a 
federal bank, what was its legality?
The state of Maryland’s tax on the Baltimore office of the Second Bank
of the United States was also struck down in McCulloch on the basis that
it violated the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause is found in
Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution stating
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be 
Supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every state shall be 
bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state 
to the contrary notwithstanding (Berman and Murphy, 2000).
As such Marshall wrote “that the states have no power, by taxation or
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into
execution the powers vested in the general government” (17 U.S. 316). In
fact, some quip that the opinion “contains language expansive enough
that it would, if taken literally, prevent states from requiring U.S. mail
trucks to stop at red lights” (Nagel 2001, 75). This wide interpretation of
federal power would be indicative of the Marshall Court’s federalism
jurisprudence and expanded to the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v.
Ogden (1824).
10
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Gibbons V. Ogden (1824)
The earliest commerce clause interpretation would occur in
Gibbons. The Commerce Clause is found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
and states Congress has the power “to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”
(Berman and Murphy, 2000). Gibbons
Involved a license to operate steamboats in the waters between 
New York and New Jersey. One man, Aaron Ogden, had 
purchased a state-issued license to do so in New York waters, 
while his former partner, Thomas Gibbons, had gone to the 
national government for a federal coasting license. It was left to 
the Supreme Court to decide whether the central government’s 
power of interstate commerce predominated over an individual 
state’s power to regulate intrastate commerce (Berman and Murphy 
2000, 107).
In a 6-0 decision, the Court again took an expansive view of federal 
power in different ways. Marshall wrote the opinion stating firstly 
defining commerce. “Commerce, undoubtedly is traffic, but it is 
something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial 
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, 
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse” (22 
U.S. 1). He then addressed the issue of intrastate commerce, “it is not 
intended to say tha t these words comprehend that commerce, which is 
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a 
State, or between the different parts of the same State, and which does 
not extend or affect other States. Such a  power would be inconvenient
11
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and is certainly unnecessary” (22 U.S. 1). Thus, it is not Congress’ place 
to regulate commerce when that commerce is completely within a  single 
state’s boundary. Thirdly, the Court ruled, “commerce among the States 
must, of necessity, be commerce with States” (22 U.S. 1). This means 
that “commerce among the states begins in one state and ends in 
another; it does not stop when the act of crossing a  state border is 
completed. Consequently, commerce tha t occurs within a  state may be 
part of a  larger interstate process” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 412). 
Lastly, the court dealt with the issue of regulation. Marshall wrote, “this 
power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be 
exercised to its utm ost extent and acknowledges no limitations, other 
than prescribed in the Constitution” (22 U.S. 1). Thus, once an activity 
was deemed to be commerce. Congress possesses the power to regulate 
it.
In all, the decision took a  very expansive definition of commerce tha t 
would dominate the Court’s jurisprudence, bu t it went one step further, 
reinforcing its strong view of national supremacy as evidenced in 
McCulloch. “In every such case, the act of Congress...is supreme; and 
the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not 
controverted, m ust yield to it” (22 U.S. 1). Again, the Court applied the 
relevance of the Supremacy Clause as the Framers intended. The 
decision was called “the ultimate in nationalism” (Mendelson 1960, 22).
12
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This sweeping conviction of national supremacy as evidenced in the 
McCulloch and Gibbons decisions signified the Marshall Court’s idea of 
federalism. In Marshall’s interpretation, the state possesses power, 
however, national sovereignty reigns supreme. It is the earliest concept 
in the history of the United States of how federalism should exist, 
however, over time this concept would be altered.
The Taney Court (1836-1864)
John Marshall’s death in 1835 marked a radical turning point of the 
Court and its interpretation of federalism. The successor to the position 
of Chief Justice would be Roger Taney, an  appointee and political crony 
of Andrew Jackson. In 1831, Jackson nominated Taney to be the U.S. 
Attorney General. In this position, “Taney played a leading role in the 
controversy over the Second Bank of the United Sates, helping to write 
President Jackson’s message in 1832 vetoing the bank’s recharter” 
(Epstein and Walker 2004, 333). Obviously, this position was in direct 
opposition to the Marshall Court and the McCulloch decision. He later 
became Jackson’s Secretary of the Treasury after the existing secretary, 
William Duane, “refused to withdraw federal deposits from the national 
bank (Epstein and Walker 2004, 333). However, Taney was never 
confirmed by the Senate, and after a  long delay, when Jackson finally 
tendered the nomination, it was hastily rejected. Believing so strongly in 
the Spoils System he championed, Jackson nominated Taney for the
13
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Court in 1835, but again, the Senate postponed the nomination.
Jackson re-nominated Taney later tha t year and was confirmed as 
Marshall’s replacement as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on March 
15, 1836. It would end up an ironic choice since Jackson did everything 
in his power to quell the Nullification Crisis of 1832-1833 and insisted on 
union, yet would appoint a  man whose constitutional interpretation 
would lead to the most cataclysmic war in United States history that 
shattered the Union.
The Taney Court’s interpretation of federalism was dual federalism. 
Dual federalism is defined as “a system of government in which both the 
states and national government remain supreme within their own 
sphere, each responsible for some policies” (Edwards et al. 2005, 79).
This interpretation very much rests on the idea tha t “federalism...means 
legalism—the predominance of the judiciary in the Constitution” (Dicey 
1902, 170-171). However, such language is nowhere mentioned in the 
Constitution and other scholars argue tha t “the federal judiciary should 
not decide constitutional questions respecting the ultimate power of the 
national government vis-à-vis the states; rather...[it] should be treated as 
nonjusticiable, final resolution being relegated to the political branches— 
i.e.. Congress and the President” (Choper 1980, 175).
14
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Thurloivv. Massachusetts; Fletcher V. Rhode Island;
Pierce v. New Hampshire 
A clear sign of the Taney’s Court interpretation of federalism is evident 
in the so-called License Cases (1847). These cases dealt with the ability 
of local m erchants to tax alcohol imports and whether or not such laws 
violated the Commerce Clause. As previously mentioned, the Marshall 
Court in its Gibbons decision again took an expansive and supreme view 
of federal power and the License Cases would directly contradict 
Gibbons. In a 9-0 decision, “the Court was unanim ous in upholding the 
states’ authority” (Hall 1992, 504). In his opinion, Taney stated “every 
power delegated to the federal government m ust be coincidence with a 
perfect right in the states to all that they have not been delegated; in 
coincidence, too, with the possessing of every power and right necessary 
for their existence and preservation” (46 U.S. 504).
Civil W ar/Reconstruction Courts (1865-1895)
After a Union victory in the U.S. Civil War, the Court returned to the 
Marshall interpretation of national supremacy.
Progressive Era Courts (1896-1936)
Dual federalism would be tweaked again at the tu rn  of the 20^  ^
Century; however, this brand of dual federalism would be different from 
the Taney Court’s. The Progressive Movement was in full force, however.
15
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the Court walked a  fine line in its jurisprudence. Epstein and Walker
(2004) argued tha t for “the Courts from the 1890s through the 1930s, 
dual federalism and the Tenth Amendment were masks to hide their 
laissez-faire philosophy.” However, this belief was questioned most 
notably by Gillman (1993). Gillman suggested that the Courts and 
opinions of this era “represented a serious, principled effort to maintain 
one of the central distinctions in nineteenth century constitutional law— 
the distinction between valid economic regulation...and invalid ‘class’ 
legislation on the other—during a time of unprecedented class conflict” 
(Gillman 1993, 10).
Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)
No case better displays the fine line the Progressive Era courts walked 
than Hammer V.  Dagenhart. The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act was 
passed by Congress in 1916 and “prohibited shipment in interstate 
commerce of factory products made by children under the age of fourteen 
or by children aged fourteen to sixteen who worked more than  eight 
hours a  day” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 342). Roland Dagenhart had 
two sons, Reuben and John, who based on North Carolina law could 
work up to 11 hours a day, which directly flew in the face of the new 
child labor law. Backed by the mill where they were employed and 
numerous big business advocates, the Dagenharts contested.
The Court ruled 5-4 in favor of Dagenhart citing a difference between 
manufacturing and commerce found in United States v. E. C. Knight
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(1895) and in doing so, they successfully “argued that the production
and manufacture of goods were not part of commerce and could not be
regulated by Congress” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 59). In the Court's
opinion. Chief Justice William Day stated
The act in a twofold sense is repugnant to the Constitution. It not 
only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over 
commerce, but also exerts a power as to a purely local m atter to 
which Federal authority does not extend. The far-reaching result 
of upholding the act cannot be more plainly indicated than by 
pointing out that if Congress can thus regulate m atters entrusted 
to local authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in 
interstate commerce, all freedom of commerce will be at an end, 
and the power of the states over local matters may be eliminated, 
and thus our system of government be practically destroyed (247 
U.S. 251).
Thus, the act was struck down and the power was returned to the states. 
Although it did indeed champion dual federalism, it differed from the 
dual federalism of the Taney Court in tha t the decision w asn’t necessarily 
advocating states’ rights. Instead, “the justices were bent on prohibiting 
any state or federal interference with the growth of the nation’s booming 
private-sector economy...at the same time, the Court limited the ability of 
states to pass similar legislation because that would restrict individual 
liberties” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 345). Thus, Hammer was more of a 
self-serving decision than one tha t truly embraced states’ rights.
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in his dissent of Hammer, “I should have 
thought that if we were to introduce our own moral conceptions where, 
in my opinion, they do not belong, this was preeminently a  case for 
upholding the exercise of all its powers by the United States” (Hall 1992,
17
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360). It was a  victory for big business; however, the onset of the Great 
Depression in the 1930s would see the case overturned and the 
emergence of a  new federalism interpretation called cooperative 
federalism.
Post-New Deal Courts (1937-1975)
The Great Depression affected all aspects of American life; however, 
one of the last places that would feel its effects was the Supreme Court. 
Indeed, the Court remained dominated by the same justices who 
presided over the Progressive Era courts. They were still steered by the 
dual federalism that was most evidently pronounced in Hammer. 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was so upset at the Court 
overturning key New Deal legislation, such as the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, tha t he proposed to expand the Supreme Court to include 
upto 15 justices and as president would get to nominate some six new 
justices. The court-packing plan failed due to a  combination of negative 
public opinion and an increasing willingness of the Court “to uphold 
Roosevelt's New Deal initiatives. Over the next few weeks, the Court 
signed off on both the Social Security Act and the National Labor 
Relations Act” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 62) without a change in Court 
personnel. The next few years saw several resignations and deaths and 
as such Roosevelt did get to appoint some five justices. This new Court 
would return to the ideas of John Marshall’s national supremacy and
18
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imprint a  new federalism interpretation known as cooperative federalism. 
Cooperative federalism is “a system of government in which powers and 
policy assignments are shared between states and the national 
government” (Edwards et al. 2005, 79).
United States v. Darby Lumber (1941)
The post-New Deal Court would not wait long to make its m ark on its
interpretation of federalism. 1938 saw the passing of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (also known as the Wages and Hours Law) that
“established a minimum wage of 40 cents per hour and a  maximum
workweek of 40 hours for businesses in interstate commerce” (Boyer
2003, 751). This piece of New Deal legislation blatantly contradicted the
Court's 1918 Hammer decision. Fred W. Darby was the owner of a
Georgia lumber company that violated the pay quota established in the
Fair Labor Standards Act and cited Hammer as his defense.
The Court, in a 9-0 decision, completely reversed itself from ju s t 23
years prior. Citing
The powerful and now classic dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes, the 
conclusion is inescapable tha t Hammer v. Dagenhart was a 
departure from the principles which have prevailed in the 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the 
decision and that such vitality, as a  precedent, as it then had has 
long since been exhausted. It should be and now is overruled (312 
U.S. 100).
The decision “also gutted the Tenth Amendment [by] denying that the 
amendment constituted a tool tha t litigants could wield to build up state 
authority tha t they could then use to challenge the exercise of
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enumerated and implied powers by the federal government” (Epstein and 
Walker 2004, 346). Yet, the decision was not a  total victory for 
cooperative federalism. It “failed to invoke the total power of Congress 
over commerce. Rather, it was made applicable to employees engaged In 
commerce’ or ‘in the production of goods for commerce”’ (Hall 1992, 217). 
This lack of clarity would see the issue emerge once again in National 
League o f Cities v. Usery (1976) and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority (1985) with the Supreme Court having to decide 
whether or not the act applied to all workers and federalism would be 
redefined yet again.
Wickard v. Filbum  (1942)
If Darby began the Court’s movement from dual federalism to 
cooperative federalism, Wickard solidified it. In Wickard, the Court ruled 
“that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity th a t is not itself 
‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes tha t the 
failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of 
the interstate market in tha t commodity” (317 U.S. 111). Under such an 
interpretation, commercial activity could be applied to nearly any 
endeavor and thus justiciable under the Commerce Clause. However, 
this was not an unbeknownst byproduct, but a  clear and rational 
decision by the Court.
The author of the Court’s opinion in Wickard was Justice Robert 
Jackson. In his personal correspondence, Jackson wrote of how the
20
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decision was symbolic of the Court crossing the Rubicon. “A frank 
holding that the interstate commerce power has no limits except those 
which Congress sees fit to observe might serve a  wholesome purpose. In 
order to be unconstitutional by the judicial process if th is Act is 
sustained, the relation between interstate commerce and the regulated 
activity would have to be so absurd tha t it would be laughed out of 
Congress” (Cushman 1998, 218). In sum, Jackson saw three key 
reasons for altering dual federalism jurisprudence. Firstly, “he thought 
that maintaining a  pretense of review brought disrespect on the 
judiciary... Second, he thought the prospect of judicial review forced 
Congress to frame legislation tha t was unnecessarily complex and 
indirect...[and lastly Jackson thought the Court ‘should not stand as a 
symbol of a protection of states right when in fact is powers has 
vanished”’ (Cushman 1998, 218). Moreover, Wickard was a  9-0 decision 
so Jackson was clearly not alone in his thinking.
The Burger Court (1969-1986)
In terms of federalism interpretation, perhaps no Court is more 
fascinating than tha t presided over by Warren E. Burger. Burger was a 
Richard Nixon appointee and “was chosen because of his judicial 
experience, his opposition to Warren Court criminal procedure decisions, 
his criticism of judicial activism, and because his career was free of 
ethical blemishes” (Hall 1992, 104). What is so fascinating about the
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Burger Court and federalism is it begins adhering to cooperative 
federalism, briefly attempts to restore some limit to the exercise of federal 
power back to cooperative federalism in a  period of only nine years. This 
is largely due to the changing make up of the Court and a key reversal of 
opinion.
National League o f Cities v. Usery (1976)
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and its constitutionality, which
was upheld in the aforementioned Darby Lumber, emerged once again
the mid-1970s. In 1974, Congress passed a “federal statute that
extended the maximum hours and minimum wage provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to most state and municipal employees” (Hall 1992,
573). A collective representing the cities called the National League of
Cities argued that the statute violated the Tenth Amendment. “As one
litigant claimed, the Tenth Amendment should protect the powers states
already possessed, including authority over public workers” (Epstein and
Walker 2004, 347). Surprisingly, the decision would be a radical
departure from cooperative federalism and national supremacy
supported by the Burger Court years earlier.
“The Court reached its decision by distinguishing between ‘traditional’
and ‘nontraditional’ governmental functions” (Devins and Fisher 2004,
66). The 5-4 opinion along ideological lines, written by Justice William
Rehnquist stated.
We have reaffirmed today tha t the States as States stand on a 
quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when
22
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challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate 
commerce...Congress may not exercise that power so as to force 
directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions 
regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be 
made. We agree tha t such assertions of power, if unchecked, would 
indeed, as Justice Douglas cautioned in his dissent in [Maryland 
V.] Wirtz, allow “the National Government [to] devour the essentials 
of state sovereignty,” and would therefore transgress the bounds of 
the authority granted Congress under the Commerce Clause (426 
U.S. 833).
However, the Court did not define what constituted “traditional” and 
“untraditional” and as such chaos and contradiction ensued in future 
applications. The decision “did not stand alone. When seen in context 
with decision such as Younger v. Harris (1971) and Huffman v. Pursue, 
Ltd. (1975) it seemed to signal judicial willingness to protect state 
political and judicial processes” (Kobylka 1986, 26). Nevertheless, ju s t 
nine years later the same Burger Court with a couple new justices would 
reverse its attem pt to limit the excesses of federal power and embrace 
cooperative federalism again.
Hunt V. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)
The North Carolina Board of Agriculture passed a  regulation in 1972 
“that required all closed containers of apples shipped into the state to 
display either the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) grade or 
nothing at all. It barred information based on the grading systems of the 
states in which the apples were grown” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 476). 
The state of Washington developed its own grading system and as such, 
placed it on all of its containers and as such, asked the state of North
23
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Carolina to make an exception, bu t they refused so the Washington State 
Apple Advertising Commission (WSAAC) sued citing violation of the Tenth 
Amendment.
WSAAC argument stated “the law clearly discriminated against
interstate commerce in favor of local growers...diminished the marketing
advantage of [Washington] state’s industry had earned...[and] increased
the cost of interstate commerce” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 477). In the
court’s 8-0 decision (Justice Rehnquist did not participate) they ruled in
favor of WSAAC stating
When discrimination against commerce of the type we have found 
is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in 
terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the 
unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to 
preserve the local interests a t stake. North Carolina has failed to 
sustain tha t burden on both scores (432 U.S. 333).
Thus, the Burger Court began to embrace cooperative federalism again.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985)
“One of the curious features of the 1976 [National League o f Cities] 
decision is tha t when the Supreme Court remanded the case to a three- 
judge district court, instead of the district court’s determining the 
difference between traditional and nontraditional functions, it said to the 
Department of Labor: You figure it out” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 67). 
Among the items listed as nontraditional, and thus having to abide by 
the Federal Labor Standards Act, was tha t of local systems of mass 
transit.
24
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After falling into debt in the 1970s, the San Antonio Transit System 
(SATS), renamed the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
(SAMTA) in 1978, “turned to the federal government for assistance. The 
federal Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) provided it with a $4 
million grant...Between 1970 and 1980, the transit system received more 
than $51 million or 40 percent of its cost from the federal government” 
(Epstein and Walker 2004, 353-354). Several employees filed suit 
against SAMTA demanding overtime pay and the case was brought before 
the Supreme Court in 1984.
As previously mentioned. National League o f Cities, and later Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association (1981), attempted to 
develop tests for what constituted traditional functions. “Despite a 
number of attempts to clarify the meaning of these tests, no clear lines 
had been established by the time of Garcia” (Hall 1992, 325). Garcia 
argued
There is nothing in the overtime and minimum-wage requirements 
of the FLSA, as applied to SAMTA, tha t is destructive of state 
sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision. The States' 
continued role in the federal system is primarily guaranteed not by 
any externally imposed limits on the commerce power, but by the 
structure of Üie Federal Government itself. In these cases, the 
political process effectively protected that role. (469 U.S. 528).
The lack of clarity since the 1976 decision saw Justice Harry Blackmun,
change his mind and overrule the decision. In the Court’s opinion,
Blackmun wrote, “we perceive nothing in the overtime and minimum-
wage requirements of the FLSA, as applied to SAMTA that is destructive
25
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of state sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision” (469 U.S. 
528). Blackmun added the Supreme Court has “no license to employ 
freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when m easuring 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause” (469 U.S. 528). 
Thus, “the Court should, except in rare and ill-defined circumstances, 
remain on the sidelines, trusting that state interests will be protected by 
the ‘political safeguards of federalism”’ (Pittenger 1992, 1).
Thus, unrestrained cooperative federalism and national supremacy 
emerged yet again; however, its victory would last only to 1995. Some 
argued, “Garcia interjects a wholly fictitious clause into Article I. It is a 
clause that commits to Congress the power to decide how far the power 
to regulate commerce should extend. It is a  clause th a t is not there and 
doubtless would have ever been adopted” (Van Alstyne 1985, 1727). 
Garcia was only a 5-4 opinion and among the dissenters was William 
Rehnquist, author of National League o f Cities. In his dissent, Rehnquist 
wrote “do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out 
further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time 
again command the support of a  majority of this Court” (469 U.S. 528). 
He would not have to wait very long.
Thus, the history of federalism in American history underwent 
significant changes. From the beginning of the republic to the post-New 
Deal Court era, dual federalism was the established federalism 
jurisprudence. However, Darby and Wickard shattered all existing
26
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understanding of federalism instituting a new interpretation known as 
cooperative federalism that allowed the federal government the power to 
regulate nearly any activity.
27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3
THE REHNQUIST COURT 
The Rehnquist Court is notable for its interpretation of federalism.
It would reexamine the post-New Deal Courts cooperative federalism 
jurisprudence and limit the excesses of federal power.
William Hubbs Rehnquist was born October 1, 1924 in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin. After serving in World War II he entered Stanford University 
earning a m aster's degree in 1949 in Political Science, the best discipline, 
and another m aster’s degree in Political Science from Harvard University 
in 1950. He followed those accomplishments with a  Ju ris  Doctorate, first 
in class, from Stanford Law School in 1951. A mere two months later he 
accepted a position from Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as a 
law clerk, a  position he would hold until 1953. “The experience of 
working for Jackson confirmed Rehnquist’s conservative instincts” 
(Tushnet 2005, 14).
As Justice Jackson’s clerk, he authored “a memorandum to help the 
justice prepare for the Court’s discussion of the constitutional challenge 
to officially segregated schools” (Hall 1992, 715). In the memo titled “A 
Random Thought on the Segregation Cases,” Rehnquist wrote several 
interesting and revealing statem ents. He argued to uphold the separate
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but equal doctrine established in Plessy stating the NAACP’s argument 
“that a  majority may not deprive a  minority of its constitution right, the 
answer m ust be made that while this is sound in theory, in the long run 
it is the majority who will determine what he constitutional rights of the 
majority are” (Tushnet 2005, 19). He also wrote “it was no part of the 
judicial function to thwart public opinion except in extreme cases” 
(Tushnet 2005, 19). Thus, it is reasonable to assume th a t racial 
segregation was not extreme enough for his point of view. Such 
statements suggest a  lack of moral fiber, but also directly refute 
necessary tenets of traditional democratic theory tha t the United States 
was founded upon, tha t being protection of minority rights tha t were 
clearly violated by segregation.
From 1953-1969 Rehnquist privately practiced law in Phoenix, 
Arizona where Arizona Senator and 1964 Republican Presidential 
candidate Barry Goldwater called him “the most conservative lawyer” 
(Tushnet 2005, 13) he ever met. “From 1969 until 1971 Rehnquist 
served as assistant attorney general for the Office of Legal Counsel. In 
that position, he supported executive authority to order wiretapping and 
surveillance without a court order, no-knock entry by the police (which 
was recently declared constitutional in Hudson v. Michigan in June  
2006), preventative detention and abolishing the exclusionary rule” (Hall 
1992, 715). These positions could be regarded as violating of the Fourth 
Amendment.
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1971 saw Justice John Marshall Harlan II announced his retirement
from the bench, so President Richard M. Nixon nominated Rehnquist as
his replacement after much cajoling from Attorney General John  Mitchell
and Counsel to the President John  Dean, two key figures in the
upcoming Watergate scandal. During the confirmation hearings the
controversial memo written as a law clerk regarding was unearthed and
Rehnquist claimed that the memo addressed Jackson’s views on the
issue, not his, but was written by Rehnquist.
Most people who have studied the matter believe that it expresses 
what Rehnquist, not Jackson, thought...Rehnquist later 
acknowledged that he couldn’t remember Jackson’s saying tha t he 
had been “excoriated by liberal’ colleagues” for upholding Plessy, 
and that Rehnquist himself had defended Plessy—at least for 
debating purposes—around the lunch table with other law clerks 
(Tushnet 2005, 20).
Nevertheless, it did not have an effect on the hearings. Following a 68-26
vote in the Senate, Rehnquist was confirmed as an Associate Justice on
January 7, 1972.
It would not take long to see Rehnquist’s views on federalism. In Roe,
Rehnquist was one of two dissenters. In his dissent, Rehnquist included
a history of anti-abortion statutes dating back to 1821 and concluded
There apparently was no question concerning the validity of this 
provision or of any of the other state statutes when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted. The only conclusion possible from this 
history is tha t the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth 
Amendment withdraw from the States the power to legislate with 
respect to this matter (410 U.S. 113).
Similarly, this belief in placing some limitations on the excesses of
federal power was evident in National League o f Cities as Rehnquist
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authored the Court’s opinion partially reversing Darby Lumber. He 
furthered indicated his position to limit the excesses of federal power in 
Moose Lodge v. Irvis (1972), Columbus v. Penick (1979), Richmond 
Newspapersv. Virginia (1980), and Carterv. Kentucky (1981) and notably 
dissented in Garcia (1985).
In 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger announced his retirement from 
the United States Supreme Court. “The Reagan administration had no 
problem figuring out who to appoint in his place. Rehnquist was an 
‘intellectual giant’ to the conservative lawyers in the Department of 
Justice and at the White House” (Tushnet 2005, 32). Following a 65-33 
vote in the Senate, Rehnquist was confirmed as the sixteenth Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court on September 26, 1986. Interestingly, “it 
was the largest number of negative votes on a successful nomination” 
(Tushnet 2005, 32) up to tha t point in American history and only the 
fourth time an Associate Justice was elevated to the Chief Justice 
position.
New York y . United States (1992)
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 declared that 
each state “responsible for providing for the availability of capacity either 
within or outside the State for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste 
generated within its borders” (505 U.S. 144). This was due to the states 
of Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina accepting a  disproportionate
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amount of radioactive waste due to having the only facilities to house 
them. The law and its 1985 amendments placed certain conditions on 
states that did not comply including graduated surcharges and finally 
demanding “that states come up with a way to dispose of low-level 
radioactive waste by 1996 or be forced to become the owners of it”
(Devins and Fisher 2004, 52). By 1990, the state of New York was far 
behind in creating its own facilities and creating a regional pact and thus 
sued claiming the law violated the Tenth Amendment. After being 
upheld at the state level, it was appealed to the Supreme Court.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act. Writing the Court’s opinion. Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor declared
States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. 
State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative 
agencies of the Federal Government. The positions occupied by 
state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most 
detailed organizational chart. The Constitution instead “leaves to 
the several States a  residuary and inviolable sovereignty,” reserved 
explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment (505 U.S. 144).
Thus, states cannot be commanded by Congress, only provide incentives.
This anti-commandeering principle is the first key decision indicative of
the Rehnquist Court’s desire to create some limit to the excesses of
federal power tha t dominated the post-New Deal era.
A significant element of the decision was a  dramatic change in the 
Court’s make-up. New to the Court were Anthony Kennedy, Antonin 
Scalia, David Souter and Clarence Thomas. All of these justices were
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nominees of conservative presidents and favored a judicial check on 
Congress. Interestingly, Thomas’ confirmation “by a 52-48 margin [was] 
the closest Supreme Court vote in more than a centuiy” (Milkis and 
Nelson 1999, 365). This make-up would continue issuing decisions that 
limited the excesses of federal power into the new millennium.
United States v. Lopez (1995)
In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zone Act citing the 
Commerce Clause, but they did not provide evidence linking commerce to 
gun possession on school grounds arguing tha t if Congress could 
conclude there was a  relationship, then tha t would be sufficient. Alfonso 
Lopez J r . , a senior at a San Antonio high school, was arrested for 
possessing a handgun on school property in March 1992 and sentenced 
to six months in prison plus parole and fines. “Lopez argued tha t the 
simple possession of a weapon on school grounds is not a  commercial 
activity that reasonably falls under the Commerce Clause. Furthermore, 
the regulation of crime and education are traditional areas of state, not 
federal, jurisdiction” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 447). The federal court 
of appeals ruled in favor of Lopez and tha t decision was appealed to the 
Supreme Court in 1995.
In a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion striking 
down the statute declaring, “The Act neither regulates a commercial 
activity nor contains a requirement tha t the possession be connected in
33
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
any way to interstate commerce. We hold tha t the Act exceeds the 
authority of Congress” (514 U.S. 549). Solicitor General of the United 
States, Drew Days, argued for the federal government stating “that 
possessing guns near schools had a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce because possessing guns near schools threatens the 
educational climate, impairing the education children get and thereby 
producing less well-educated and less productive graduates” (Tushnet 
2005, 260).
Rehnquist responded stating “under the theories tha t the Government 
presents...it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even 
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where the States 
have historically have been sovereign” (514 U.S. 549). He concluded by 
declaring.
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to 
pile inference upon inference in a m anner that would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a 
general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, 
some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, 
giving great deference to congressional action. The broad language 
in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional 
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so 
would require u s to conclude tha t the Constitution's enumeration 
of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated and 
tha t there never will be a distinction between what is truly national 
and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do (514 U.S. 549).
It was “the first time since 1936 tha t the Court had struck a  federal law
on the basis of the Commerce Clause (Waltenberg and Swinford 1999,
102).
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The opinion did have four dissenters, three of whom filed opinions.
Justice Stephen Breyer argued “Congress...had a rational basis for
finding a significant (or substantial) connection between gun-related
school violence and interstate commerce...As long as one views the
commerce connection, not as a Technical legal conception,’ but as ‘a
practical one’” (514 U.S. 549) citing Swift & Co. v. United States (1905).
Furthermore, he saw a  clear connection between school and commerce
as “education, although far more than  a m atter of economics, has long
been inextricably intertwined with the Nation’s economy” (514 U.S. 549).
He concluded by noting three serious legal problems the decision created
that include running
Contrary to modem Supreme Court cases that have upheld 
congressional actions despite connections to interstate or foreign 
commerce that are less significant than the effect of school 
violence..., the Court believes the Constitution would distinguish 
between two local activities, each of which has an identical effect 
upon interstate commerce, if one, but no the other, is ‘commercial’ 
in nature..., [and] threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law 
that, until this case, seemed reasonably well settled” (514 U.S. 
549).
Justice John Paul Stevens added in his dissenting opinion.
Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used 
to restrain commerce. Their possession is the consequence, either 
directly or indirectly, of commercial activity. In my judgment. 
Congress' power to regulate commerce in firearms includes the 
power to prohibit possession of guns at any location because of 
their potentially harmful use; it necessarily follows that Congress 
may also prohibit their possession in particular markets (514 U.S. 
549).
In the third dissenting opinion. Justice David Souter stated.
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Court observes that the Gun-Free School Zones Act operates 
in two areas traditionally subject to legislation by the States, 
education and enforcement of criminal law. The suggestion is 
either that a connection between commerce and these subjects is 
remote, or that the commerce power is simply weaker when it 
touches subjects on which the States have historically been the 
primary legislators. Neither suggestion is tenable (514 U.S. 549).
In his concurring opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas outright declared 
“we ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence” (514 U.S.
549). The decision marked the return of what Douglas Ginsburg called 
the Constitution in Exile. This is “m eant to identify legal doctrines that 
established firm limitations on state and federal power before the New 
Deal...(and thus] encourage judges to strike down laws on behalf of 
rights tha t don’t appear explicitly in the Constitution” (Rosen 2005). 
Lopez was by no means a  simple case of poor arguments by the 
government, but followed the example of New York and later Printz,
Alden, Morrison, etc. tha t there would be a restoration on the limitations 
to the exercise of federal power. It was a key departure from the New 
Deal, pre-Rehnquist Court interpretations tha t would continue with the 
Court further placing limitations on the excesses of federal power.
Seminole Tribe ofFloridav. Florida (1996)
Amendment XI: The Judicial power o f the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one o f the United States by Citizens o f another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects o f any Foreign State.
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Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, “any Indian tribe 
having jurisdiction over Indian lands...shall request the State in which 
such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of 
entering into a  Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming 
activities. Upon receiving such a  request, the State shall negotiate with 
the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact” (517 U.S. 44).
The Seminole Tribe cited Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989) where 
“a divided Court ruled that the Commerce Clause permitted Congress to 
make an exception to the Eleventh Amendment's grant of immunity, 
holding that the power to regulate commerce ‘among several S tates’ 
would be ‘incomplete without the authority to render States liable in 
damages’” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 372).
In a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the Court’s opinion 
stating.
In the five years since it was decided. Union Gas has proven to be a 
solitary departure from established law... In overruling Union Gas 
today, we reconfirm that the background principle of state 
sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not 
so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an 
area, like the regulation of Indian commerce that is under the 
exclusive control of the Federal Government. Even when the 
Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over 
a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional 
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting 
States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under 
Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the 
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. 
Petitioner's suit against the State of Florida m ust be dismissed for 
a lack of jurisdiction (517 U.S. 44).
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In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens noted “the importance of the 
majority's decision...cannot be overstated...It prevents Congress from 
providing a  federal forum for a  broad range of actions against States, 
from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning 
bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national 
economy” (517 U.S. 44).
In yet another dissent. Justice David Souter noted.
There is no possible argument tha t the Eleventh Amendment, by 
its terms, deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over all citizen 
lawsuits against the States. Not even the Court advances tha t 
proposition, and there would be no textual basis for doing so. 
Because the plaintiffs in today's case are citizens of the State that 
they are suing, the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to 
them (517 U.S. 44).
As it pertained to the right for a federal court to hear the case, Souter in
a  lengthy discussion of history concluded “because neither text,
precedent, nor history supports the majority's abdication of our
responsibility to exercise the jurisdiction entrusted to u s in Article III, I
would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals” (517 U.S. 44).
However, some argued that the decision was not widely applicable 
since “Congress has provided a  remedy against the state but not against 
state officials” (Monaghan 1996, 132). However, the application would be 
expanded in Alden v. Maine (1999). Detractors of the decision argued it 
violated Article III of the Constitution and “exemplified the Court’s 
increasingly adam ant refusal to countenance the headlong expansion of
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Congress’ regulatory power under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause” 
(Waltenberg and Swinford 1999, 121).
Printz V. United States {1997)
The 1993 Brady Handgun Prevention Act “required the Attorney 
General to establish a national instant background check system by 
November 30, 1998” (521 U.S. 898). It was an addendum to the Gun 
Control Act of 1968 tha t forbade the sale of guns to various criminals 
and mentally unstable individuals. In states that did not have 
background-checking systems, it mandated that the local chief law 
enforcement officer (CLEG) “conduct background checks on prospective 
handgun purchases” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 71). Sheriff Jay  Printz of 
Ravalli County, Montana sued objecting “to being pressed into federal 
service, and contend[ed] that congressional action compelling state 
officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional.” (521 U.S. 898) as 
decreed in New York.
In a 5-4 decision, Antonin Scalia wrote the Court’s opinion ruling in 
favor of Printz and striking down the act stating, “it is incontestable that 
the Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’ Although the 
States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, 
they retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,”’ (521 U.S. 898) as 
discussed in Federalist No. 37. Citing New York, Scalia emphatically 
added “the mandatory obligation imposed on CLEOs to perform
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background checks on prospective handgun purchases plainly runs 
afoul” (521 U.S. 898) of the court’s 1992 ruling. Furthermore, Scalia 
added.
Today we hold tha t Congress cannot circumvent tha t prohibition 
by conscripting the State’s officers directly. The Federal 
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to 
address particular problems, nor command the S tates’ officers, or 
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a 
federal regulatory program. It m atters not whether policymaking is 
involved, and no case by case weighing of the burdens or benefits 
is necessary, such commands are fundamentally incompatible with 
our constitutional system of dual sovereignty (521 U.S. 898).
Among the dissenters was Justice John Paul Stevens who cited the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Tenth Amendment as the basis for
the legality of the Brady Handgun Prevention Act.
The Tenth Amendment imposes no restriction on the exercise of 
delegated powers...The Amendment confirms the principle tha t the 
powers of the Federal Government are limited to those affirmatively 
granted by the Constitution, but it does not purport to limit the 
scope or the effectiveness of the exercise of powers tha t are 
delegated to Congress. Thus, the Amendment provides no support 
for a  rule that immunizes local officials from obligations tha t might 
be imposed on ordinary citizens (521 U.S. 898).
Justice David Souter cited The Federalist as the basis of his dissent.
Hamilton in No. 27 first notes tha t because the new Constitution 
would authorize the National Government to bind individuals 
directly through national law, it could “employ the ordinary 
magistracy of each [State] in the execution of its laws.” Were he to 
stop here, he would not necessarily be speaking of anything 
beyond the possibility of cooperative arrangements by agreement. 
But he then addresses the combined effect of the proposed 
Supremacy Clause, and state officers' oath requirement, and he 
states that “the Legislatures, Courts and Magistrates of the 
respective members will be incorporated into the operations of the 
national government, as far as its ju s t and constitutional authority 
extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its 
laws.” The natural reading of this language is not merely tha t the
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officers of the various branches of state governments may be 
employed in the performance of national functions; Hamilton says 
tha t the state governmental machinery “will be incorporated” into 
the Nation's Operation, and because the “auxiliary” sta tus of the 
state officials will occur because they are “bound by the sanctity of 
an oath,” I take him to mean that their auxiliary functions will be 
the products of their obligations thus undertaken to support 
federal law, not of their own, or the States', unfettered choices (521 
U.S. 898).
Furthermore, in No. 44 Madison wrote, “the members of the federal 
government will have no agency in carrying the State constitutions into 
effect. The members and officers of the State governments, on the 
contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the Federal 
Constitution” (Publius 1961, 284). Souter concluded “in light of all these 
passages, I cannot persuade myself tha t the statements from No. 27 
speak of anything less than the authority of the National Government, 
when exercising an otherwise legitimate power (the commerce power, 
say), to require ‘auxiliaries’ to take appropriate action” (521 U.S. 898).
Aldenv. Maine (1999)
A group of probation officers brought suit against the state of Maine 
in 1992 for failure to pay overtime as dictated in the Federal Labor 
Standards Act. While the suit was pending the Supreme Court ruled in 
Seminole Tribe “even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete 
law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment 
prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
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unconsenting States” (517 U.S. 44). The probation officers’ suit was 
dismissed and appealed to the Supreme Court in 1999.
“Alden presented the first opportunity for the Court to determine
whether Article I permits Congress to abrogate a states’ immunity in its
own courts” (Mezey 2000, 32). Writing for the Court’s opinion. Justice
Anthony Kennedy wrote
It is unquestioned that the Federal Government retains its own 
immunity from suit not only in state tribunals but recognizing the 
essential sovereignty of the States, we are reluctant to conclude 
that the States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege...When 
Congress legislates in m atters affecting the States, it may not treat 
these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations. 
Congress m ust accord States the esteem due to them as joint 
participants in a federal system, one beginning with the premise of 
sovereignty in both the central Government and the separate 
States (527 U. S. 706).
Thus, the suit was dismissed and extended the Seminole ruling.
In his dissent. Justice David Souter wrote on the issue of federalism.
The State of Maine is not sovereign with respect to the national 
objective of the FLSA. It is not the authority tha t promulgated the 
FLSA, on which the right of action in this case depends. That 
authority is the United States acting through the Congress, whose 
legislative power under Article I of the Constitution to extend FLSA 
coverage to state employees has already been decided, see Garcia 
V. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985), and is not 
contested here (527 U. S. 706).
As it pertains to the Framers’ intent, he wrote that “the Court abandons
a principle...much closer to the hearts of the Framers: th a t where there
is a right, there m ust be a remedy” (527 U. S. 706). And thus, citizens
have no remedy. Indeed, “Eleventh Amendment doctrine today creates
vast areas in which the states can operate without much concern about
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federal judicial enforcement of the constitutional or federal statutory 
rights of individuals” (Doernberg 2002, 149). This is a  potentially 
dangerous predicament. In fact, the decision “may signify tha t immunity 
federalism is the Court’s new strategy of choice for preserving, or 
reestablishing, some balance between state and nation” (Young 1999,
51). Again, the Court was limiting the excesses of federal power
United States v. Morrison (2000)
In 1994 Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 
that
Provided money for shelters for abused women eind for educational 
programs about violence against women. It made it easier to 
enforce orders restraining abusive men from approaching their 
victims by making it a  federal crime to cross state lines to harm  a 
person protected by a  restraining order. VAWA also had a civil 
remedy provision, allowing people—mostly women, of course— 
attacked by others on the basis of their gender to sue the attackers 
in federal court for damages (Tushnet 2005, 261).
That same year, Virginia Tech student Christy Brzonkala claimed fellow
students Antonio Morrison and Jam es Crawford raped her. “So
traumatizing was the episode, she related, tha t she dropped out of school
and attempted suicide” (Leuchtenburg 2002, 91). After receiving what
she deemed unsatisfactory remedies from the university, she decided to
sue the two men and Virginia Tech citing the VAWA. The provision
dealing with a  federal remedy was the particular issue at hand and the
inferior courts ruled against Brzonkala. She appealed to the Supreme
Court.
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Unlike in Lopez, “Congress had made extensive findings that sexual 
assaults on women seriously affected their participation in the nation’s 
economy. Women didn’t take some jobs tha t would have been available 
to them because they were afraid of being assaulted, and they didn’t 
travel from one state to another because of their fears” (Tushnet 2005, 
264). Moreover, “Congress am assed findings and compiled a  record to 
demonstrate that domestic violence and sexual assault cost the economy 
$5 to $10 billion a year” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 72).
Writing the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist struck down the
civil remedy provision stating.
Gender motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity... As we stated in Lopez, “[S]imply 
because Congress may conclude tha t a particular activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily 
make it so.” Rather, “[wjhether particular operations affect 
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional 
power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a  judicial rather 
than a  legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this 
Court”... We accordingly reject the argument tha t Congress may 
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on 
tha t conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The 
Constitution requires a  distinction between what is truly national 
and what is truly local. In recognizing this fact we preserve one of 
the few principles that has been consistent since the Clause was 
adopted. The regulation and punishm ent of intrastate violence that 
is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved 
in interstate commerce has always been the province of the States 
(529 U. S. 598).
Despite noting Congress’ economic findings, the majority dismissed 
them.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice David Souter argued against
Rehnquist’s claim regarding who decides what falls under interstate
commerce stating
Congress has the power to legislate with regard to activity that, in 
the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The 
fact of such a substantial effect is not an issue for the courts in the 
first instance, bu t for the Congress, whose institutional capacity 
for gathering evidence and taking testimony far exceeds ours. By 
passing legislation. Congress indicates its conclusion, whether 
explicitly or not, that facts support its exercise of the commerce 
power. The business of the courts is to review the congressional 
assessment, not for soundness but simply for the rationality of 
concluding tha t a  jurisdictional basis exists in fact... True, the 
methodology of particular studies may be challenged, and some of 
the figures arrived at may be disputed. But the sufficiency of the 
evidence before Congress to provide a  rational basis for the finding 
cannot seriously be questioned (529 U. S. 598).
He further cited Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1997) tha t
stated “the Constitution gives to Congress the role of weighing conflicting
evidence in the legislative process” (520 U.S. 180) and finally tha t “the
Act would have passed m uster a t any time between Wickard in 1942 and
Lopez in 1995, a period in which the law enjoyed a  stable understanding
that congressional power under the Commerce Clause, complemented by
the authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause extended to all activity
that, when aggregated, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce”
(529 U. S. 598).
Justice Stephen Breyer added in his separate dissenting opinion “the 
Constitution itself refers only to Congress' power to ‘regulate 
Commerce...among the several States,' and to make laws ‘necessary and 
proper’ to implement tha t power. The language says nothing about
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either the local nature, or the economic nature, of an interstate-
commerce-affecting cause” (529 U. S. 598). Additionally,
His most pointed observation was tha t under the Court’s theory, 
you could have two activities, one economic and other 
noneconomic, with precisely identical effects on the national 
economy, and Congress would have the power to regulate the first 
and not the second, a result Breyer thought entirely inconsistent 
with the idea underlying the commerce clause (Tushnet 2005,
264).
Nevertheless, was the opinion tha t drastic of a shift? Not really. It 
merely applied the rational-basis test established in Lopez and when 
applied here, it failed to pass m uster for a majority of justices.
Conclusion
Some have questioned the dissenters of Rehnquist Court decisions 
stating “by refusing to accept the majority's attem pt to breathe life into 
the federalism doctrine, the dissenters—who include some of the ablest 
minds on the Court—have missed the opportunity to collaborate in 
fashioning a  meaningful, yet practical, demarcation between the national 
and the local” (Fried 2000, A29).
In sum.
First, the Court has systematically shifted the federalism balance 
toward the states in its expansion of the doctrine of Younger v. 
Harris through the 1970s and 1980s. Second, it has greatly 
increased the scope of state immunity to federal law and federal 
suits, with both substantive (Alden v. Maine (1999)) and expanded 
procedural components (Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996)). Third, 
the Court has narrowed congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause (United States v. Morrison (2000) and United States v. Lopez 
(1995)). Fourth, it has limited congressional power under Section
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5 of the Fourteenth Amendment {Board of Trustees o f the University 
o f Alabama v. Garrett (2001)). Fifth, it has circumscribed 
congressional power to require states to assist in implementing 
federal programs (New Yorkv. United States (1992)) (Doemberg 
2005, 129-130).
However, has the Rehnquist Court by placing limitations to the excesses 
of federal power drastically altered cooperative federalism as evidenced in 
Darby Lumber and Wickard? No. The core of those decisions still exists, 
but the Court has placed some limitations to areas that had previously 
gone unfettered. As the Rehnquist Court further proceeded into the 21®^  
Century, it would further display that the Court did still rely on the core 
of cooperative federalism as evidenced in Nevada Department o f Human 
Resources V. Hibbs (2003), Granholmw. Heald (2005), Gonzales v. Raich 
(2005), Kelo v. City o f New London (2005), and Gonzales v. Oregon (2006).
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CHAPTER 4
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES v. HIBBS (2003)
Amendment XIV, Section 1 : All persons bom or naturalized in the 
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens o f 
the United States and o f the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities o f citizens o f the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person o f life, liberty, or property, without due process 
o f law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection o f the laws.
Amendment XIV, Section 5: The Congress shall have power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions o f this article.
In 1993, Congress passed the Family Medical Leave Act (hereafter 
FMLA), which sought to “alleviate sexually discriminatory hiring 
practices. The FMLA allowed for women and men to take three months 
off from work for family care without being fired” (Perla 2003). Moreover, 
the law dictates the leave is unpaid and “employees in high-ranking or 
sensitive positions are simple ineligible for FMLA leave: of particular 
importance to the States, the FMLA expressly excludes from coverage 
state elected officials, their staffs, and appointed policymakers” (538 U.S. 
721). Furthermore, an employee wasn’t  eligible until after a  year or 
1,250 hours of service.
William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human 
Resources utilized the FMLA when his wife was involved in a  serious
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automobile accident and required neck surgery. “In addition, Hibbs was 
worried tha t his wife’s depression, which was caused by the pain 
medication she was taking, required round-the-clock attention” (Perla 
2003). He requested and received the maximum of 12 weeks of unpaid 
leave. Hibbs did not return to work after his allotted leave and as such 
was fired.
Hibbs filed suit in federal district court and lost due to the Court’s 
belief tha t the suit violated the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. 
He appealed and tha t decision was reversed with the Ninth Circuit Court 
ruling “the FMLA should be treated differently because the FMLA is 
aimed at remedying gender discrimination, which is subject to 
heightened scrutiny” (Perla 2003). The case was then granted certiorari 
by the Supreme Court. It was argued Januaiy  15, 2003 and decided 
May 27, 2003.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled in favor of Hibbs. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion (concurring were O’Connor, 
Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens and Breyer). In doing so, he took special care 
to note tha t the decision was not a  departure from the Court’s previous 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as evidenced in Seminole Tribe and 
Board o f Trustees o f Univ. o f Alabama v. Garrett (2001), but rather an 
example of how those decisions could be utilized to successfully 
challenge the statute. “We have made clear that the Constitution does 
not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against non-consenting
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States. Congress may, however, abrogate such immunity in federal court 
if it makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of 
the statue and acts pursuant to a  valid exercise of its power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment” (538 U.S. 721). The FMLA 
stated “an action to recover the damages or equitable relief prescribed in 
paragraph 1 may be maintained against any employer (including a public 
agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction” (29 
U.S.C. §2617(a)(2)). Obviously, the government would classify as a 
public agency and as such is applicable. As such, the FMLA relied on 
Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as its source of power as 
determined in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976). “In other words, Congress may 
enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially 
constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional 
conduct” (538 U.S. 721).
City o f Boeme v. Flores (1997) established a test by which the Court 
can determine if a statute is a  valid exercise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The test m ust show “congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted 
to that end” (521 U.S. 507). Furthermore, the Court ruled in Craig 
Boren (1976) “statutory classifications that distinguish between males 
and females are subject to heightened scrutiny” (538 U.S. 721) and thus 
not the rational-basis test. Indeed, “what separates Hibbs from its
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predecessors is the Court’s characterization of the constitutional right 
protected and the nature of the discrimination” (W. Williams 2004, 327).
Rehnquist openly admitted the Court’s chauvinistic history as it 
pertained to gender discrimination. Some scholars claim “such honesty 
suggests that the Court may have been predisposed to accepting 
Congress’s evidence of statewide gender discrimination” (Williams 2004, 
328). The evidence in question involved Bureau of Labor Statistics 
surveys that showed a  widening gap (33 percent to 16 percent in one 
year to 37 percent to 18 percent the next) of available leave between 
females and males following childbirth. Other data showed “many States 
offered women extended ‘maternity’ leave tha t far exceeded the typical 4- 
to 8-week period of physical disability due to pregnancy and childbirth, 
but very few States granted men a parallel benefit: Fifteen States 
provided women up to one year of extended maternity leave, while only 
four provided men with the same” (538 U.S. 721). The Court saw this as 
a clear example of gender discrimination. Furthermore, when debating . 
the merits of the FMLA, “Congress had evidence that, even where state 
laws and policies were not facially discriminatory, they were applied in 
discriminatory ways” (538 U.S. 721) often via individual discrimination of 
those person in positions of power.
Rehnquist then detailed the states lackluster record in dealing with 
gender discrimination. Admittedly, states began to address the issue
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before the federal government; nonetheless, their actions possessed
numerous shortcomings.
First, seven States had childcare leave provisions that applied to 
women only. Indeed, M assachusetts required th a t notice of its 
leave provisions be posted only in "establishment[s] in which 
females are employed." These laws reinforced the very stereotypes 
tha t Congress sought to remedy through the FMLA. Second, 12 
States provided their employees no family leave, beyond an initial 
childbirth or adoption, to care for a seriously ill child or family 
member. Third, many States provided no statutorily guaranteed 
right to family leave, offering instead only voluntary or 
discretionary leave programs. Three States left the am ount of leave 
time primarily in employers' hands. Congress could reasonably 
conclude that such discretionary family-leave programs would do 
little to combat the stereotypes about the roles of male and female 
employees tha t Congress sought to eliminate. Finally, four States 
provided leave only through administrative regulations or 
personnel policies, which Congress could reasonably conclude 
offered significantly less firm protection than a  federal law. Against 
the above backdrop of limited state leave policies, no m atter how 
generous petitioner's own may have been. Congress was justified in 
enacting the FMLA as remedial legislation. In sum, the States' 
record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, 
gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits 
is weighty enough to justify the enactm ent of prophylactic Section 
5 legislation (538 U.S. 721).
Since gender discrimination falls within the realm of higher scrutiny and
not rational-basis review it differs from decisions in Kimel and Garrett.
“Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a
gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than  our rational-
basis test—it m ust ‘serv[e] important governmental objectives’ and be
‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives’” (538 U.S.
721). Furthermore, those cases dealt with extremely broad laws, while
“two characteristics of the FMLA distinguish it from the previous
antidiscrimination legislation. Firstly, Congress did not redefine the
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constitutional right which the FMLA sought to protect. Second, the 
FMLA had a narrower scope, aimed solely at remedying the pattern of 
gender discrimination in employers’ family-leave policies, than  the 
previous legislation” (W. Williams 2004, 330). For example, the Court 
found in Boeme tha t the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s “sweeping 
coverage ensured its intrusion at every level of government, displacing 
law and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and 
regardless of subject matter” (521 U.S. 507). However, in Hibbs the 
Court found that the FMLA was “congruent and proportional to its 
remedial object” (538 U.S. 721).
Among those penning brief concurring opinions were Justices Souter 
and Stevens. Souter stated the decision was in line with his Section 5 
jurisprudence dating back to his dissents in Seminole Tribe and Kimel. 
Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence that there is no doubt tha t the 
Eleventh Amendment could not dismiss the case and cites the Commerce 
Clause as the basis. “Accordingly, Nevada’s sovereign immunity defense 
is without merit” (538 U.S. 721).
Justice Kennedy wrote the primary dissent. The dissent targeted the 
majority’s claim that the FMLA was a remedial program and instead 
insisted it was an entitlement program, as well as, an overall lack of 
evidence. “The evidence to substantiate this charge m ust be far more 
specific, however, than a  simple recitation of a general history of 
employment discrimination against women” (538 U.S. 721). Kennedy
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also pointed out numerous irregularities in the majority’s evidence such 
as the statistics used are those which polled the private sector and thus 
not the state which would obviously fall in the public sector. Moreover, 
certain laws discussed involved parenting leave, while the case at hand 
dealt with caring for any family member. Regarding individual 
discrimination Kennedy wrote, “even if there were evidence that 
individual state employers, in the absence of clear statutory guidelines, 
discriminated in the administration of leave benefits, this circumstance 
alone would not support a finding of a  state-sponsored pattern of 
discrimination” (538 U.S. 721).
The dissent also picked apart the argument of the states not offering
equal family leave to their employees. It
Boils down to the fact tha t three States, M assachusetts, Kansas, 
and Tennessee, provided parenting leave only to their female 
employees, and had no program for granting their employees (male 
or female) family leave. As already explained, the evidence related 
to the parenting leave is simply too attenuated to support a  charge 
of unconstitutional discrimination in the provision of family leave. 
Nor, as the Court seems to acknowledge, does the Constitution 
require States to provide their employees with any family leave at 
all. A State's failure to devise a family leave program is not, then, 
evidence of unconstitutional behavior (538 U.S. 721).
Interestingly, Kennedy stated that those who felt discriminated against
by the state could still sue utilizing the Commerce Clause. In
summation, Kennedy stated
What is a t issue is only whether the States can be subjected, 
without consent, to suits brought by private persons seeking to 
collect moneys from the state treasury. Their immunity cannot be 
abrogated without documentation of a pattern of unconstitutional 
acts by the States, and only then by a congruent and proportional
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remedy. There has been a complete failure by respondents to cany  
their burden to establish each of these necessary propositions (538 
U.S. 721).
The majority’s use of evidence is particularly interesting because “n 
Kimel, the Court limited its search for evidence before Congress to the 
legislative history of the ADEA. Similarly, when searching for evidence 
before Congress in the Garrett case, the Court looked only to the 
legislative history of the ADA, and not to the general history of state 
discrimination against the disabled” (MacConaill 2005, 853).
In a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia brandished the 
majority for lumping the states together “as some sort of collective entity 
which is guilty or innocent as a  body” (538 U.S. 721) and instead m ust 
examine “whether the State has itself engaged in discrimination 
sufficient to support the exercise of Congress's prophylactic power” (538 
U.S. 721).
Hibhs was a monumental decision because “although the Court’s 
early decisions clarified what legislation would not satisfy the congruence 
and proportionality test, it was not until Hibbs tha t we learned what 
legislation would pass the test” (W. Williams 2004, 318). This precedent 
would be critical in future cases tha t attem pt to invoke Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, such as Tennessee v. Lane (2004) that 
successfully argued tha t disabled persons can sue the state if not 
provided handicap-accessible government facilities. Some even 
suggested “given the growing criticism of the congruence and
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proportionality test, it would not be unreasonable to speculate tha t the 
Court sought a case tha t would validate its test by offering a modem 
example of congruent and proportional legislation” (W. Williams 2004, 
336). Nevertheless, the majority of scholars viewed the act as a  retreat 
from its previous Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence 
laid out since Seminole Tribe.
Furthermore, the victory “was important more for doctrinal and 
symbolic reasons than for practical ones: if Mr. Hibbs had lost, the 
practical result would have been limited to the 3.4 percent of the 
workforce comprised of state employees. Yet Hibbs was of vital 
importance, both for work/family advocates and for constitutional law”
(J. Williams 2004, 368).
The votes of Rehnquist and O’Connor surprised many scholars 
(Rehnquist more than  O’Connor). Rehnquist ensures to mention that the 
decision was not a departure from Seminole Tribe, et al. and thus, not a 
radical change. Some scholars argue his vote could be based on 
personal history as he cared for “a terminally ill wife...and sometimes left 
work early to help out his daughter (a single mother and a lawyer) had 
child care problems” (J. Williams 2004, 374-375). Some have speculated 
. that his traditional conservatism is partially to credit. As Assistant 
Attorney General, Rehnquist felt the Equal Rights Amendment was 
dangerous and could lead to “nothing less than  the sharp reduction in 
importance of the family unit, with the eventual elimination of tha t unit
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by no means improbable” (Mayeri 2004, 814). Similarly, O'Connor's 
personal history could be somewhat accountable for her vote. O’Connor 
“has an established track record on family caregiving issues...She cut 
back to part-time work for seven years in order to raise her children” (J. 
Williams 2004, 374).
The decision was a big victory for women’s groups who “hailed the 
ruling not only for its explicit statem ent tha t Congress has more leeway 
to pass laws combating gender discrimination than other forms of bias, 
such as age and disability” (Mauro 2003). The decision was a clear 
victory for civil rights advocates as well, bu t they nonetheless found error 
in the judgment. Some find the Court’s “premise tha t there are some 
types of discrimination that really m atter, while others types of 
discrimination do not matter even enough to allow congressional action” 
(Chemerinsky 2004, 99) unjust since it is not applicable to age and 
disability.
Others found that the decision merely represented another example of 
the Supreme Court unjustly overruling Congress like a  patriarch would a 
son or daughter. The Court “substituted its own judgm ent for tha t of 
Congress in reviewing the weight of the congressional findings abut he 
need for prophylactic legislation and the appropriate statutoiy remedy for 
the asserted injury” (Bucholtz 2003-2004, 84). Such action is very much 
indicative of the post-New Deal Courts. The “decision suggests;..the 
existence of a line in the sand the Court is not willing to cross. This
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Court is ready to require more from a state challenging a  congressional 
attempt to remedy discrimination that implicates the core of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” (MacConaill 2005, 855).
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CHAPTER 5
GRANHOLMv. HEALD (2005)
Amendment XXI, Section 2: The transportation or importation 
into any State, Territory, or possession o f the United States for  
delivery or use therein o f intoxicating liquors, in violation of 
the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
The issue of liquor is one that is omnipresent in American 
constitutional law. In fact, there are two of only twenty-seven 
amendments devoted it. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited it, while 
the Twenty-first Amendment repealed that prohibition and added the 
section above.
The growth of the Internet in the 1990s and 2000s saw an explosion 
of wineries many of which are small and family-operated. In order to 
reduce costs and be profitable, many of these wineries utilize direct 
shipping of their liquors to consumers. “Direct sales to consumers 
account for $350 million in annual sales from the more than 3, 200 
wineries in this countiy” (Greenhouse 2005). Each state possesses “a 
three-tiered system: liquor producer to licensed wholesaler to licensed 
retailer” (Stout 2005) for the distribution of liquor, thus direct shipping 
eliminates the wholesaler and retailer from the equation. Some 24 states 
ban direct shipping from out-of-state wineries. Among those states are 
Michigan and New York.
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Granholm is combination of cases brought by plaintiffs arguing
against both the Michigan and New York statutes. “Under Michigan law,
wine producers, as a general matter, m ust distribute their wine through
wholeslaers. There is, however, an exception for Michigan’s
approximately 40 in-state wineries, which are eligible for Vine m aker’
licenses that allow direct shipping to in-state consumers” (544 U.S. 460).
Meanwhile, New York’s law is less obvious.
It channels most wine sales through the three-tier system, but it 
too makes exceptions for in-state wineries. As in Michigan, the 
result is to allow local wineries to make direct sales to consumers 
in New York on terms not available to out-of-state wineries. 
Wineries that produce wine only from New York grapes can apply 
for a license that allows direct shipment to in-state consumers. 
These licensees are authorized to deliver the wines of other 
wineries as well, bu t only if the wine is made from grapes “at least 
seventy-five percent the volume of which were grown in New York 
state.” An out-of-state winery may ship directly to New York 
consumers only if it becomes a  licensed New York winery, which 
requires the establishment of “a  branch factory, office or storeroom 
within the state of New York” (544 U.S. 460).
The plaintiffs in both cases “claimed tha t the Michigem liquor Laws were
in violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution because
they discriminated against interstate sales and delivery of wine, thereby
providing a direct economic advantage to in-state businesses and
interfering with the free flow of commerce (Gerwin and Saylor 2005).
However, these cases address the dorm ant Commerce Clause. That is
the “implicit limitation it places on state legislative power. In other
words, the negative implication of the Commerce Clause is tha t states
may not exercise similar power in an explicit area of federal
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congressional authrotiy. The dormant Commerce Clause thus limits the 
ability of states to regulate their own commerce in a  way tha t could 
impact interstate commerce” (Ballard 2006, 307).
In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled for the plaintiffs stating “the laws in
both States discriminate against interstate commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause and tha t the discrimination is neither authorized nor
permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment” (544 U.S. 460). Writing for
the majority (which included Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer),
Anthony Kennedy began citing Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department
o f Environmental Quality o f Ore in which the Court determined that
“differential tream tm ent of in-state and out-of-state economic interests
that benefits the former and burdens the latter” (511 U.S. 93) is violative
of the Commerce Clause. He further stated.
The rule prohibiting state discrimination against interstate 
commerce follows also from the principle tha t States should not be 
compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or 
disfavored status for their own citizens. States do not need, and 
may not attempt, to negotiate with other States regarding their 
m utual economic interests. Rivalries among the States are thus 
kept to a minimum, and a proliferation of trade zones is prevented 
(544 U.S. 460).
This principle is very similar to the anti-commandeering principle 
established in New Yorkv. United States (1992).
In an exhaustive discussion of liquor law since the 1880s, Kennedy 
notes two principles established by the Court prior to the 18* 
Amendment. “First, the Court held that the Commerce Clause prevented 
States from discriminating against imported liquor...Second, the Court
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held that the Commerce Clause prevented States from passing facially 
neutral laws tha t placed an impermissible burden on interstate 
commerce” (544 U.S. 460). In 1917, Congress passed and overrode 
President William Howard Taft’s veto of the Webb-Kenyon Act which 
stated.
That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids 
transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for 
use, consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in 
such State of Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the 
laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police 
powers, to the same extent and in the same m anner as though 
such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or 
Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being 
introduced therein in original packages or otherwise (544 U.S.
460).
However, Webb-Kenyon did not give states the right to discriminate. 
Instead, Kennedy states “the Wilson Act reaffirmed, and the Webb- 
Kenyon Act did not displace, the Court's line of Commerce Clause cases 
striking down state laws that discriminated against liquor produced out 
of state. The rule of Tieman, Walling, and Scott remained in effect: States 
were required to regulate domestic and imported liquor on equal term s” 
(544 U.S. 460).
The Court then turned to the Twenty-first Amendment. The Court 
found “the aim...was to allow States to maintain an effective and uniform 
system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, 
importation, and use. The Amendment did not give States the authority 
to pass nonuniform laws in order to discriminate against out-of-state 
goods, a privilege they had not enjoyed at any earlier time” (544 U.S.
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460). Following the Twenty-first Amendment’s ratification in December 
1933 through 1940, the Court ruled in num erous cases tha t the 
Amendment permitted discrimination such as State Bd. O f Equalization 
of Cal. V. Young’s Market Co. (1936). The majority found these decisions 
to be “inconsistent with history.” Also note th a t such decisions were 
before the post-New Deal Era and the introduction of Wickard.
The Court instead relied on recent cases dealing with the Section 2 of 
the Twenty-first Amendment. “First, the Court has held th a t state laws 
that violate other provisions of the Constitution are not saved by the 
Twenty-first Amendment...Second, the Court has held tha t Section 2 
does not abrogate Congress' Commerce Clause powers with regard to 
liquor” (544 U.S. 460). In fact, in Hostetterv. Idlewild Liquor Corp. (1964) 
the Court ruled
To draw a conclusion from this line of decisions tha t the Twenty- 
first Amendment has somehow operated to “repeal” the Commerce 
Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned 
would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce 
Clause had been pro tanto “repealed,” then Congress would be left 
with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce in 
intoxicating liquor. Such a  conclusion would be patently bizarre 
and is demonstrably incorrect (377 U.S. 324).
The Court then definitively ruled “the Court has held tha t state
regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of
Commerce Clause” (544 U.S. 460). This was most pronounced in
Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias (1984) when the Court ruled “the central
purpose of the Amendment was not to empower States to favor local
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liquor industry by erecting barriers to competition” (468 U.S. 263).
Thus, the three-tier system utilized in states is constitutional as long as 
it is applicable to everyone, including in-state wineries.
Lastly, Michigan and New York argue there are “two primary 
justifications for restricting direct shipments from out-of-state wineries: 
keeping alcohol out of the hands of minors and facilitating tax collection” 
(544 U.S. 460). Both the Court found to be weak stating th a t minors are 
less likely to drink wine than  other forms of alcohol and th a t a simple 
adult signature requirement upon delivery would suffice. However, that 
does pose an interesting question if the item of commerce were beer or 
liquor that are more likely to be consumed by minors. As for taxation, “if 
licensing and self-reporting provide adequate safeguards for wine 
distributed through the three-tier system, there is no reason to believe 
they will not suffice for direct shipm ents” (544 U.S. 460). The majority of 
the Court thus concluded “if a State chooses to allow direct shipment of 
wine, it m ust do so on evenhanded terms. Without demonstrating the 
need for discrimination. New York and Michigan have enacted 
regulations tha t disadvantage out-of-state wine producers. Under our 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these regulations cannot stand” (544 
U.S. 460). Thus, the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause was 
very much an expansive one as evident since Wickard.
64
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The dissenters in the case were Stevens, Thomas, O'Connor and
Rehnquist. Stevens penned a  dissenting opinion emphasizing the
original intent and contemporary rulings of the period. He argued
Today many Americans, particularly those members of the younger 
generations who make policy decisions, regard alcohol as an 
ordinary article of commerce, subject to substantially the same 
market and legal controls as other consumer products. That was 
definitely not the view of the generations that made policy in 1919 
when the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified or in 1933 when it 
was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment... The views of judges 
who lived through the debates tha t led to the ratification of those 
Amendments are entitled to special deference. Foremost among 
them was Justice Brandeis, whose understanding of a  State's right 
to discriminate in its regulation of out-of-state alcohol could not 
have been clearer (544 U.S. 460).
He then regurgitated the 1933-1940 decisions that held this view.
Nevertheless, he concluded by noting, “today's decision may represent
sound economic policy and may be consistent with the policy choices of
the contemporaries of Adam Smith who drafted our original Constitution”
(544 U.S. 460). Alcohol is obviously an item of commerce and any
reasonable reading of the Commerce Clause suggests tha t it is not
exceptional. Indeed, to make it exceptional would severely undermine
the Commerce Clause’s legitimacy.
Justice Thomas wrote a far lengthier dissent questioning the 
majority’s interpretation of history. He particularly emphasizes the 
Webb-Kenyon Act “because tha t Act's language displaces any negative 
Commerce Clause barrier to state regulation of liquor sales to in-state 
consumers” (544 U.S. 460). He further argues that Michigan and New 
York laws
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are within the Webb-Kenyon Act's terms and therefore do not run  
afoul of the negative Commerce Clause. Those laws restrict out-of- 
state wineries from shipping and selling wine directly to Michigan 
and New York consumers. Any winery tha t ships wine directly to a 
Michigan or New York consumer in violation of those state-law 
restrictions is a  “person interested therein” “intend[ing]” to “s[ell]” 
wine “in violation of’ Michigan and New York law, and thus comes 
within the terms of the Webb-Kenyon Act (544 U.S. 460).
Furthermore, he argued Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co.,
(1917) established tha t Webb-Kenyon’s “purpose was to prevent the
immunity characteristic of interstate commerce from being used to
permit the receipt of liquor through such commerce in States contrary to
their laws” (242 U.S. 311). Based on this history of the Webb-Kenyon
Act alone, Thomas concludes tha t Michigan and New York are allowed to
discriminate. Nevertheless, he entertains the Twenty-first Amendment,
Section 2 argument.
Again, Thomas argued that when viewed through that lens, the
discrimination laws are constitutional.
Though the Twenty-first Amendment mirrors the basic terminology 
of the Webb-Kenyon Act, its language is broader, authorizing 
States to regulate all “transportation or importation” tha t runs 
afoul of state law. The broader language even more naturally 
encompasses discriminatory state laws. Its terms suggest, for 
example, that a State may ban imports entirely while leaving in­
state liquor unregulated, for they do not condition the State's 
ability to prohibit imports on the manner in which state law treats 
domestic products (544 U.S. 460).
He also reinforced Justice Stevens’ assertion of contemporary
interpretations that upheld discriminatory laws should be given
deference. Interestingly,
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though the dissents reached an outcome somewhat similar to 
those in early cases, their conceptual approach is as different from 
the Court’s approach in those cases as is the majority’s in 
Granholm. The Court in the 1930s refused to consider the history 
of Section Two, and without considering that history, it is 
impossible to arrive at either the Granholm majority’s or dissents’ 
positions, which all require Section Two to mean something other 
than what the text suggests (Nielson 2006, 753).
It should also be mentioned tha t Thomas’ strict constructionist ideology
would assumedly cause his dissent since the majority relies on the
implicit.
Perhaps his most damaging argument is in regard to the Court’s 
usage of Bacchus. “This is odd, because the Court does not even 
mention, let alone apply, the ‘core concerns’ test tha t Bacchus 
established. The Court instead sub silentio casts aside tha t test, 
employing otherwise-applicable negative Commerce Clause scrutiny and 
giving no weight to the Twenty-first Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon 
Act” (544 U.S. 460). The Court should have “considered the legitimacy of 
the local interest asserted by the states [by] weighing them against the 
federal interest” (Williams 2006, 634). Thus, the Court utilized its 
expansive Wickard interpretation of the Commerce Clause. He concluded 
“the Court does this Nation no service by ignoring the textual commands 
of the Constitution and Acts of Congress. The Twenty-first Amendment 
and the Webb-Kenyon Act displaced the negative Commerce Clause as 
applied to regulation of liquor imports into a  State. They require 
sustaining the constitutionality of Michigan's and New York's direct-
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shipment laws” (544 U.S. 460). In sum, “his dissent reflected the belief 
tha t the majority insisted on making policy decisions tha t were 
ultimately better left to the states” (Ballard 2006, 317).
The Court’s decision is very much an extension of its Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence since Wickard. Indeed, the Court placed emphasis 
on the post-New Deal Court’s interpretation of the Twenty-first 
Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon Act and outright stated that the 
1933-1940 decisions were false. Furthermore, the Court relied on 
implicit language that is not found in the Constitution furthering its 
ability to regulate anything and everything tha t falls within the realm of 
commerce. Critics of the dormant Commerce Clause cited “the 
inconsistent application and use of imprecise criteria when [the Court] 
does apply the doctrine...Some commentators have based their 
criticisms...on the source of the Court opinions, calling for the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause to serve the function that the dormant Commerce 
Clause now performs” (Ballard 2006, 319).
“It is plain that those who favor free markets have reason to celebrate 
the Court’s holding, which obliterated laws tha t appear to be motivated 
be rent seeking” (Nielson 2006, 750). There is no doubt the laws were 
discriminatory and furthermore “no member of the Court...fails to 
recognize the legitimacy of the antidiscrimination principle, although 
Justice Thomas ahs written it is not found in the dormant Commerce 
Clause but instead in the Import-Export Clause” (Nielson 2006, 752).
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The potential damage of course involves the three-tier system utilized 
in the states. The ruling has the potential to damage wholesalers and 
retailers by simply bypassing them. Indeed, “while the three-tier system 
is constitutionally permissible, it is not constitutionally m andated” 
(Rutledge and Daniels 2006, 55). However, it is unlikely th a t many wine 
consumers will make their purchases online in the immediate future. 
However, as the Internet continues to grow it could become more 
hazardous. “Hours after the ruling the head of Michigan’s Liquor Control 
Commission, Nida Samona, said at a telephone news conference that she 
would urge the state’s Legislature to prohibit all direct sales”
(Greenhouse 2005).
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CHAPTER 6
GONZALES V. RAICH (2005)
The year 2005 saw a  clear indication that the Rehnquist Court was 
not undergoing a  federalism revolution. Tackling the issue of medical 
marijuana, the opinion was a clear reinforcement of the Court’s belief in 
cooperative federalism.
In 1970, “Congress set out to enact legislation that would consolidate 
various drug laws on the books into a comprehensive statute, provide 
meaningful regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent 
diversion into illegal channels, and strengthen law enforcement tools 
against the traffic in illicit drugs” (000 U.S. 03-1454). The result was the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. In the 
act. Congress divided various narcotics into different levels called 
schedules. Marijuana was, and is still today, categorized as a Schedule I 
drug “because of [a] high potential for abuse, lack of any accepted 
medical use, and absence of any accepted safety for use in medically 
supervised treatm ent” (000 U.S. 03-1454). Interestingly, “as a young 
lawyer in the Nixon White House, Rehnquist helped to write the 
Controlled Substances Act” (Gardner 2004).
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Angel Raich is a California resident who suffered from an inoperable
cancerous brain tumor. “She has tried 35 approved medications for
relief of seizures and constant pain. None of them has worked, but
marijuana has been a  godsend” (Kilpatrick 2004, 1 IB). She was able to
use m arijuana for treatm ent since California passed the Compassionate
Use Act of 1996.
The proposition was designed to ensure that “seriously ill” 
residents of the State have access to m arijuana for medical 
purposes, and to encourage Federal and State governments to take 
steps toward ensuring the safe and affordable distribution of the 
drug to patients in need. The Act creates an exemption from 
criminal prosecution for physicians, as well as for patients and 
primary caregivers who possess or cultivate m arijuana for 
medicinal purposes with the recommendation or approval of a 
physician (000 U.S. 03-1454).
Raich was unable to cultivate the m arijuana herself, so she had two
friends, also named in the suit as John Does, do so. Another plaintiff in
the case is Diane Monson who suffers from “chronic back pain and
spasms” (Leef 2005). She cultivated the m arijuana herself. In sum, “11
states [have] legalized the use of m arijuana for patients under a doctor’s
care” (Mears 2005).
“On August 15, 2002, county deputy sheriffs and agents from the 
federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) came to Monson’s 
home...[and] after a 3-hour standoff, the federal agents seized and 
destroyed all six of her cannabis plants” (000 U.S. 03-1454). This 
caused the plaintiffs to file suit in October 2002 “charg[ing] tha t Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and the DEA administrator, Karen Tandy, had
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violated the[ir] constitutional rights” (Leef 2005). The plaintiffs cited the 
Tenth Amendment, Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and doctrine of medical necessity in particular. 
When the case reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, they ruled in 
favor of Raich. They “concluded use of medical m arijuana was non­
commercial, and therefore not subject to congressional oversight of 
‘economic enterprise’” (Meeirs 2005). Indeed, the Court’s decision would 
be an interesting one. “It gave the conservatives a choice: uphold the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling favoring individuals engaged in the wholly 
intrastate nan-economic activity of growing and consuming cannabis for 
medical purposes as recommended by a  doctor and permitted by state 
law or retreat from the landm ark Commerce Clause decisions” (Barnett 
2005) in Lopez and Morrison.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held against Raich “ruling that the federal 
government can still ban possession of [marijuana] in states tha t have 
eliminated sanctions for its use in treating symptoms of illness” (Lane 
2005, AOl). However, it did not strike down the state laws. Writing for 
the majority (which included Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
interestingly Kennedy and Scalia), Justice John Paul Stevens noted that 
the “respondents’ challenge is actually quite limited; they argue tha t the 
CSA’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of 
marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of 
marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds
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Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause” (000 U.S. 03-1454). 
Some critics decried that “from a practical standpoint, any possibility of 
using the Commerce Clause to regulate non-commercial activity appears 
doomed” (Kramer 2001, 143) after Morrison, however, Raich shows tha t 
to be false. The opinion rested largely on three previous court cases, 
Wickardv. Filbum (1942), Lopez, and Morrison.
As previously mentioned, in Wickard, the Court ruled “that Congress 
can regulate purely intrastate activity tha t is not itself ‘commercial,’ in 
that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that the failure to regulate 
that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate 
market in that commodity” (317 U.S. 111). The plaintiffs detailed three 
areas that their case differed from Wickard, however, Stevens wrote 
“those differences, though factually accurate, do not diminish the 
precedential force of this Court’s reasoning” (000 U.S. 03-1454). 
Furthermore,
In assessing the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce 
Clause, we stress that the task before u s is a  modest one. We need 
not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the 
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, bu t only 
whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding. Given the 
enforcement difficulties tha t attend distinguishing between 
m arijuana cultivated locally and m arijuana grown elsewhere, and 
concerns about diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty 
concluding tha t Congress had a  rational basis for believing that 
failure to regulate the intrastate m anufacture and possession of 
m arijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in 
Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the 
interstate m arket in a fungible commodity. Congress was acting 
well within its authority to “make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce ... among the several
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States.” That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate 
activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we 
refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme. (000 
U.S. 03-1454).
It is the larger scheme issue tha t would again invoke Lopez and Morrison.
“Here, respondents ask us to excise individual applications of a 
concededly valid statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and 
Morrison, the parties asserted that a  particular statute or provision fell 
outside Congress' commerce power in its entirety. This distinction is 
pivotal,” Justice Stevens added. The key distinction is not only th a t the 
CSA was part of a  comprehensive action, thus the act itself would have to 
be accused, but also that it dealt with issues that are “quintessentially 
economic...Because the CSA is a  statute tha t directly regulates 
economic, commercial activity, our opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on 
its constitutionality” (000 U.S. 03-1454). Furthermore, the plaintiffs did 
not question Congress’ power to pass the act.
Among the concurring justices were Anthony Kennedy and Antonin 
Scalia—two conservative federal power limitation supporters. Some 
question Kennedy’s vote since he did not file a  concurring opinion. 
However, some have suggested “Kennedy, it has been clear for some 
time, has little tolerance, judicial or otherwise, for those who are users of 
drugs, or who resist drug control m easures” (Dennison 2005). He 
silently voted in favor of anti-drug positions in U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis
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Buyers' Cooperative (2001) and Board o f Education o f Independent School 
District No. 92 o f Pottawatomie County v. Earls (2002).
As for Scalia, he filed a concurring opinion outlining his stance. The
key for him was the Necessary and Proper Clause. He noted.
Activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not 
themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to 
regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause 
alone...[And] the authority to enact laws necessary and proper for 
the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws 
governing intrastate activities tha t substantially affect interstate 
commerce. Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate 
commerce effective. Congress may regulate even those intrastate 
activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate 
commerce (000 U.S. 03-1454).
Thus, since cultivation of m arijuana by Californians possessed an effect
on interstate commerce, the Necessary and Proper Clause allows
Congress to regulate the activity. Now, on the surface it appeared to be a
retreat from his previous jurisprudence, however, it is actually merely a
tempering. He continued,
Lopez and Morrison affirm that Congress may not regulate certain 
“purely local” activity within the States based solely on the 
attenuated effect tha t such activity may have in the interstate 
market. But those decisions do not declare noneconomic intrastate 
activities to be categorically beyond the reach of the Federal 
Government. Neither case involved the power of Congress to exert 
control over intrastate activities in connection with a  more 
comprehensive scheme of regulation; Lopez expressly disclaimed 
that it was such a case and Morrison did not even discuss the 
possibility that it was. To dismiss this distinction as “superficial 
and formalistic,” is to m isunderstand the nature of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, which empowers Congress to enact laws in 
effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its 
authority to enact in isolation” (000 U.S. 03-1454).
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The key then is the presence of “a  more comprehensive scheme of 
regulation” (000 U.S. 03-1454). This particular case possessed it, while 
the others did not. He was not reversing himself, bu t merely noting that 
in a  particular instance, when a  comprehensive scheme is present, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause can be extended to intrastate activity. This 
is a  cooperative federalism notion.
Furthermore, he noted, “neither respondents nor the dissenters 
suggest any violation of state sovereignty of the sort tha t would render 
this regulation ‘inappropriate,’—except to argue that the CSA regulates 
an area typically left to state regulation. That is not enough to render 
federal regulation an inappropriate m eans” (000 U.S. 03-1454).
However, he left wide open the potential of arguing the case with the 
Tenth Amendment as the focus.
Justice O’Connor based her opinion on the Tenth Amendment,
particularly noting the sta te’s police power. “This case exemplifies the
role of States as laboratories. The States' core police powers have always
included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens” (000 U.S. 03-1454). Thus, Congress
does not have the authority to regulate such matters. She further
argued that the lack of findings and statistics harm the case.
Even assuming tha t economic activity is at issue in this case, the 
Government has made no showing in fact tha t the possession and 
use of homegrown m arijuana for medical purposes, in California or 
elsewhere, has a  substantial effect on interstate commerce...There 
is simply no evidence tha t homegrown medicinal m arijuana users 
constitute, in the aggregate, a  sizable enough class to have a
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discernable, let alone substantial, impact on the national illicit 
drug market—or otherwise to threaten the CSA regime. Explicit 
evidence is helpful when substantial effect is not “visible to the 
naked eye” (000 U.S. 03-1454).
That is an  interesting argument; however, to O’Connor the case did not
pass her rational-basis review test. Finally, she rested her argument on
Lopez, which stated “whether particular operations affect interstate
commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a  legislative
question” (514 U.S. 549). However, “if one really believes in the
laboratories concept, one should want to free the states to conduct their
policy experiments, not to empower judges to decide which experiments
are the good ones and which are the bad” (Althouse 2005, 788).
In the case, the Court reaffirmed its cooperative federalist beliefs 
noting tha t there are areas that fall well within the bounds of federal 
power. They employed the rational-basis test established in Lopez and in 
this instance it passed. The Court ruled in favor of Congress regulating 
an intrastate noneconomic activity by citing its exhaustive precedents, 
most notably tha t of the post-New Deal era’s Wickard decision. However, 
it is not a  watershed case marking the death of Lopez and Morrison. “All 
a  future Court need to do to reconcile Raich with Lopez is to stress that 
[the] congressional findings satisfy the heightened rationality review 
implicit in Iqpez” (Barnett 2005, 747). Moreover, “Raich did not overrule 
Lopez and Morrison. The anti-commandeering principle remains...It is
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also possible tha t in a  case presenting a  less politically charged topic 
than medical marijuana, the Court will return to its project of policing at 
least an  outer limit to the powers of Congress” (Reynolds and Denning 
2005, 933).
Lastly, the true legacy of the Raich decision may be the revelation of a
clear distinction between members of the conservative faction. Firstly,
“one of the lessons relate to Justices Kennedy and O’Connor. Although
they have provided the crucial fourth and fifth votes, they (especially
Justice Kennedy) have also been decidedly more nationalist than many
observers have realized” (Claeys 2005, 792). Indeed, Kennedy voted with
the liberal bloc in both Kelo and Oregon, and O’Connor would in Oregon
as well. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated, those cases do not
challenge Lopez and Morrison and actually exacerbate them.
Furthermore, the staunch conservatives Thomas and Scalia differed.
Thomas represents the views of “originalists,” who seek above all 
else to identify and follow the original meaning of the relevant 
constitutional text. Scalia represents the views of “judicial 
minimalists,” who seek above all else to develop rules that 
minimize the interpretive and policymaking discretion of federal 
judges. Although originalism and minimalism complement one 
another in many cases, they do not always do so and Raich marks 
the New Federalism case where these two approaches diverged 
(Claeys 2005, 791).
This is quite interesting. However, the true key is how conservative are
new appointees John Roberts and Samuel Alito? “Further, Raich
continued the Supreme Court’s uninterrupted practice of rejecting as-
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applied challenges to federal statutes, and is likely to preclude any such 
suits in the future” (Adler 2005, 751).
Despite losing the decision, Angel Raich has begun litigation again on 
the issue. This time she has “narrow[ed] the matter to the right to life 
theory: that m arijuana should be allowed if it is the only viable option to 
keep a patient alive or free of excruciating pain” (Kravets 2006, 9A). Her 
case was argued in March 2006 in front of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals that ruled in her favor in 2003. As of publication time, the case 
had not been decided. Nevertheless, “even if it is successful, the case 
would be unlikely to stop the federal raids on pot clubs or protect most 
users and suppliers” (Kravets 2006, 9A). Moreover, it is not a  case 
dealing with federalism. However, this author believes if the case 
reaches the Supreme Court, Raich will again be ruled against since there 
is no unequivocal test to determine tha t m arijuana is the only drug that 
alleviates suffering.
Those who argue tha t the Rehnquist Court dismantled the 1937 
Constitutional Revolution need to look no further than the Raich 
decision. It was firm in supporting its precedent in Wickard and applied 
its rational-basis review to determine the outcome, which of course is 
conservative.
79
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 7
KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON (2005)
Amendment V: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment o f 
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time o f War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same ojfence to be twice put 
in jeopardy o f life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived o f life, liberty, 
or property, without due process o f law; nor shall private  
property be taken for public use, without ju st compensation.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was applied to state 
action via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause (property) in 
Chicago, Burlington 8& Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago (1897). In the 
opinion. Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote “the conclusion of the court 
on this question is that, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, 
compensation for private property taken for public uses constitutes an 
essential element in due process of law,' and that without such 
compensation the appropriation of private property to public uses, no 
matter under what form of procedure it is taken, would violate the 
provisions of the federal constitution” (166 U.S. 226). In Januaiy  2000, 
the City of New London, Connecticut approved of a  plan to “seize 15 
properties from private owners and transfer the real estate to private 
developers for later hotel, office and conference center projects” (Hamey
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2005, FOI) citing the power of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment that states “nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without ju s t compensation.” This Takings Clause, also known as 
power of eminent domain, was the key issue in the case. Moreover, the 
entity tha t was to develop the property was a  private one.
The City of New London (hereafter C ity’) argued tha t
Decades of economic decline led a  state agency in 1990 to 
designate the City a “distressed municipality.” In 1996, the 
Federal Government closed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 
which had been located in the Fort Trumbull area of the City and 
had employed over 1,500 people. In 1998, the City’s 
unemployment rate was nearly double that of the State, and its 
population of ju s t under 24,000 residents was at its lowest since 
1920 (000 U.S. 04-108).
Collectively, this showed the City to be in a clear state of decline.
Nevertheless, Pfizer, the pharmaceutical giant, was building a  new $270
million facility in City and as such, the City wanted to implement a
comprehensive economic revitalization program to the surrounding area.
The City asked the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a
private entity, to create such a  plan. The NLDC’s plan targeted 90 acres
of land that included “115 privately owned properties, as well as 32 acres
of land formerly occupied by the naval facility,” (000 U.S. 04-108) 18 of
which constituted Trumbull State Park. In sum, the plan was “projected
to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other
revenues...and to make the City more attractive and to create leisure and
recreational opportunities on the waterfront and in the park” (000 U.S.
04-108).
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After purchasing most of the property, there was a select group who 
refused to sell under any circumstances. “Susette Kelo and six other 
families...filed suit arguing their property rights were being violated by 
well-connected developers” (Mears 2005). They cited the aforementioned 
Takings Clause, particularly the “public use” portion. Indeed, in the past 
“government’s authority to condemn land for public use traditionally has 
been used to eliminate slums, or build highways, schools, and other 
public works” (Mears 2005), however, the homes of Kelo, et al. were by 
no means blighted nor was there a  clear public use in the proposed 
revitalization. The Connecticut State Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
City and in February 2005 the case was argued before the Supreme 
Court and decided that June.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the City’s right of 
eminent domain. Justice John  Paul Stevens, who was joined by 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, wrote the majority opinion. The 
basis of the ruling rested on two previous Court decisions, Berman v. 
Parker (1954) and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff {1984).
The key phrase under consideration was “public use.” Stevens 
argued.
While many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed “use by 
the public” as the proper definition of public use, tha t narrow view 
steadily eroded over time. Not only was the "use by the public" test 
difficult to administer {e.g., what proportion of the public need 
have access to the property? at what price?), bu t it proved to be 
impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society. 
Accordingly, when this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment 
to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the
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broader and more natural interpretation of public use as “public 
purpose.” See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,
(1896)...[and] Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., (1906)
(000 U.S. 04-108).
Thus, it is this interpretation of “public purpose” not “public use,” based
on over one hundred years of precedent that m ust be taken into
consideration. The issue then becomes what is “public purpose” and
Stevens added, “without exception, our cases have defined that concept
broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative
judgments in this field” (000 U.S. 04-108).
In Berman, the Court ruled in favor of the city of Washington, D.C. 
and its development plan of a blighted neighborhood. Berman claimed 
that his store was not blighted, but the Court stated, “The area m ust be 
planned as a  whole. It was not enough, they believed, to remove existing 
buildings tha t were unsanitary or unsightly...The entire area needed 
redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed for 
the region, including not only new homes but also schools, churches, 
pairks, streets, and shopping centers” (348 U.S. 26). Moreover, deference 
to the legislature is again reinforced, “It is within the power of the 
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well 
as healthy...If those who govern the District of Columbia decide tha t the 
Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing 
in the Fifth Amendment tha t stands in the way” (348 U.S. 26).
Indeed, in the case of Kelo, the legislative body of the City of New 
London deemed it appropriate to reinvigorate the area and indicative of
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the Berman decision, clearly possesses tha t right. Secondly, it is the 
duty of legislative bodies to define public purpose, which City did.
Thirdly, the plaintiffs’ domiciles cannot be excluded as exceptions as it 
could undermine the entire project and create festering problems for the 
future good.
Nevertheless, a key aspect of Kelo’s argument was tha t economic 
development does not constitute “public use.” Stevens added “putting 
aside the unpersuasive suggestion that the City's plan will provide only 
purely economic benefits, neither precedent nor logic supports 
petitioners' proposal. Promoting economic development is a traditional 
and long accepted function of government...Quite simply, the 
government's pursuit of a  public purpose will often benefit individual 
private parties” (000 U.S. 04-108). That conclusion was reached in 
Berman as well when that opinion stated, “the public end may be as well 
or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a 
department of government—or so the Congress might conclude. We 
cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the 
public purposes of community redevelopment projects” (348 U.S. 26). 
Lastly, the Court struck down the notion of giving Person B, Person A’s 
land for simple economic gain because this case dealt with a 
comprehensive plan and not a simple exchange.
Kelo further argued tha t there should be a “‘reasonable certainty’ tha t 
the expected public benefits will actually accrue” (000 U.S. 04-108),
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However, in M idkiffthe Court stated, “when the legislature's purpose is 
legitimate and its m eans are not irrational, our cases make clear that 
empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than  debates over 
the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be 
carried out in the federal courts” (467 U.S. 229). Again, it’s a legislative 
power.
The key swing vote in the decision was tha t of Anthony Kennedy, a
conservative justice who broke from the ranks in this particular case. He
filed a concurring opinion. The key to him was the rational-basis review
under the Public Use Clause th a t indicates whether takings “intended to
favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public
benefits” (000 U.S. 04-108) and if so, m ust be struck down.
The trial court concluded, based on these findings, tha t benefiting 
Pfizer was not “the primary motivation or effect of this development 
plan”; instead, “the primary motivation for [respondents] was to 
take advantage of Pfizer's presence.” Likewise, the trial court 
concluded tha t “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate t h a t ... 
[respondents] were motivated by a desire to aid [other] particular 
private entities.” Even the dissenting justices on the Connecticut 
Supreme Court agreed tha t respondents' development plan was 
intended to revitalize the local economy, not to serve the interests 
of Pfizer, Corcoran Jennison [developer], or any other private party. 
This case, then, survives the meaningful rational basis review that 
in my view is required under the Public Use Clause (000 U.S. 04- 
108)
Thus, even though his opinion sided with City, it was a  cautious 
concurrence “signal[ing] that governments seeking to use eminent 
domain powers to try to revitalize cities m ust show in the public benefits 
of such projects” (Biskupic and Koch 2005). That test being the rational
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basis review. Moreover, “a more stringent standard of review might be 
appropriate according to Justice Kennedy” (Nicholson and Mota 2005,
98).
Among the dissenters. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote an 
opinion. She cited the social contract and Colder v. Bull (1798) in which 
the Court ruled
An act of the Legislature (for 1 cannot call it a  law) contrary to the 
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a 
rightful exercise of legislative authority...A few instances will 
suffice to explain what 1 mean...[A] law that takes property from A. 
and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to 
entrust a Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be 
presumed that they have done it (000 U.S. 04-108).
She further argued “were the political branches the sole arbiters of the
public-private distinction, the Public Use Clause would am ount to little
more than hortatory fluff. An external, judicial check on how the public
use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if this
constraint oil government power is to have any meaning” (000 U.S. 04-
108). However, the key to her dissent is the decision “severely
undermines the concept of checks and balances in this important area of
constitutional law” (Kanner 2006, 338). Thus, again her primary qualm
was that the Court should be the final say on such issues.
So, how does this case represent a  reaffirmation of cooperative 
federalism or indicate a  limitation on the excesses of federal power?
On one hand the decision clearly possessed an expansive view of 
governmental powers and rested its laurels on precedents {Berman and
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Midkifj] established during the post-New Deal Court era. Moreover, it 
utilized a wide interpretation of the Constitution beyond its mere 
construction as indicative of “public use” becoming “public purpose.” 
Furthermore, the decision stated tha t it is the domain of the legislature, 
not the judiciary to determine the various intents, thus deferring to 
them, which is clearly differentiated in the Constitution and a  hallmark 
of federalism.
Interestingly, “two months after the ruling, addressing a bar 
association meeting. Justice Stevens called [the decision] ‘unwise’ and 
said he would have opposed it had he been a  legislator and not a federal 
judge bound by precedent” (Broder 2006, Al). Thus, it is precedent that 
guided the decision.
However, the victory very much belongs to the states. In the final 
paragraph of the majority opinion Stevens added “we emphasize that 
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further 
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power” (000 U.S. 04-108). 
Indeed,
The reaction from the states was swift and heated. Within weeks of 
the court's decision, Texas, Alabama and Delaware passed bills by 
overwhelming bipartisan margins limiting the right of local 
governments to seize property and tu rn  it over to private 
developers. Since then, lawmakers in three dozen other states have 
proposed similar restrictions and more are on the way, according 
to experts who track the issue (Broder 2006, Al).
Kelo empowers states to act on the issue and not defer to the federal
government for its decisions.
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O’Connor argued “states play many important functions in our system 
of dual sovereignty, bu t compensating for our refusal to enforce properly 
the Federal Constitution (and a provision to curtail state action, no less) 
is not among them” (000 U.S. 04-108).
Some have argued “the real way to stop the abuse of em inent domain 
is not to forbid its use for economic development, but to make sure that 
the funds so designated could have been used by the locality for other 
purposes tha t likely would have had broader public support and 
benefits” (Fischer 2006, 32). For example, if local citizens could have 
better roads, more schools, etc. would they prefer the money be spent 
there? If not, it should not be done. “The process of a  city and its 
citizens arguing about alternative uses of the money and ending up  using 
it to buy a  site to promote economic development would make it more 
convincingly a ‘public u se’” (Fischel 2006, 35). However, the Court 
struck down such test proposals in Fallbrook Irrigation D ist v. Bradley,
(1896) and Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. (1906) for their 
impracticality.
“Lawmakers in 47 states have introduced more than  325 m easures to 
protect private property” (Mehren 2006, lA). Indeed, many have 
“expressed concern that state officials, in their zeal to protect 
homeowners and small businesses, would handcuff local governments 
that are trying to revitalize dying cities and fill in blighted areas with 
projects that produce tax revenue and jobs” (Broder 2006, Al). Some
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jurists have even proposed a constitutional amendment (Cohen 2006, 
566-577) to ban economic development takings. Ironically, such an 
action would be the most extreme instance of federal empowerment.
Only time will tell.
As for the revitalized New London waterfront, as of November 2005,
nothing had been accomplished. “Wary of public disapproval...the state
and the city have halted plans to evict the remaining residents. Investors
are concerned about building on land tha t some people consider a
symbol of property rights. At the same time, contract disputes and
financial uncertainty have delayed construction even in areas tha t have
been cleared” (Yardley 2005, Al). Moreover,
In September [2005], Gov. M. Jodi Rell of Connecticut demanded 
tha t the New London Development Corporation...rescind eviction 
orders delivered to tenants in rental units tha t belong to 
homeowners who have refused to give up their property. The 
Connecticut General Assembly has asked cities to delay using 
eminent domain while it considers revising state law (Yardley 2005, 
A22).
The states are autonomous in their own sphere and able to decide 
whether or not they should allow takings in the name of economic 
revitalization and the Court came to its opinion by merely reiterating 
previous cooperative federalism decisions.
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CHAPTER 8
GONZALES V.  OREGON {2006)
On November 9, 2001, Attorney General of the United States John
Ashcroft issued the following Interpretive Rule:
Assisting suicide is not a  “legitimate medical purpose” within the 
meaning of 21 CFR 1306.04 (2001), and that prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to 
assist suicide violates the Controlled Substances Act. Such 
conduct by a  physician registered to dispense controlled 
substances may “render his registration . . . inconsistent with the 
public interest” and therefore subject to possible suspension or 
revocation under 21 U. S. C. 824(a)(4). The Attorney General's 
conclusion applies regardless of whether state law authorizes or 
permits such conduct by practitioners or others and regardless of 
the condition of the person whose suicide is assisted (000 U.S. 04- 
623).
This Interpretive Rule, sometimes referred to as the ‘Ashcroft Directive,’ 
was in direct response to the state of Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act. 
“The 1994 law gives Oregon doctors the authority to prescribe controlled 
substances to mentally competent, terminally ill patients who are within 
six months of dying” (Lucas 2005). Furthermore, a second doctor m ust 
then examine the patient and agree with the decision and “once the law’s 
safeguards have been met, attending doctors may prescribe, bu t not 
themselves administer, a fatal drug” (Kilpatrick 2006). In fact, “Oregon 
voters have twice approved the law, in 1994 and also in 1997” (Lucas
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2005). It is unknown how many total patients have utilized the act, but 
37 patients did so in 2004.
Ashcroft interpreted “the Controlled Substances Act and announc[ed] 
that assisted suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose' tha t would 
allow doctors to prescribe Schedule II drugs under the act. Oregon, 
joined by physicians and terminally ill patients challenged the rule” 
(Mauro 2006). Since the Attorney General is the nation’s leading law 
enforcement officer, Ashcroft surmised this gave him the power to 
threaten physicians who prescribe Schedule II drugs tha t if they do so for 
the purpose of assisted suicide “their registration to distribute controlled 
substances...[could be] revoked or be criminally prosecuted for violating 
federal law” (Bloustein and Sachs 2006).
The case reached the 9 ^  Circuit Court of Appeals in May 2004, where 
it ruled in favor of Oregon. “The majority found the directive unlawful 
and unenforceable because it violated the plain language of the CSA, 
undermined Congress’ intent and overstepped the bounds of the Attorney 
General’s authority” (Bloustein and Sachs 2006). The Government 
appealed the decision and the case was argued before the U.S. Supreme 
Court on October 5, 2005.
On January 17, 2006, the Court ruled 6-3 in favor of Oregon. The 
majority opinion, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy (joined by 
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter and O’Connor), dealt with the primary 
issue of “the Interpretive Rule’s validity under the CSA...The parties
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before u s  are in sharp disagreement both as to the degree of deference we 
must accord the Interpretive Rule’s substantive conclusion and whether 
the Rule is authorized by the statutory text at all” (000 U.S. 04-623).
As it pertains to deference, there are two precedential cases the Court 
considered, Auerv. Robbins (1997) and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council (1984). Oregon differed from Auer in the 
respect tha t the “underlying regulation does little more than restate the 
terms of the statute itself. The language the Interpretive Rule addresses 
comes from Congress, not the Attorney General, and the neeir- 
equivalence of the statute and regulation belies the Government's 
argument for Auer deference” (000 U.S. 04-623).
Now,
If a  statute is ambiguous, judicial review of administrative 
rulemaking often demands Chevron deference; and the rule is 
judged accordingly. All would agree, we should think, that the 
statutory phrase “legitimate medical purpose” is a  generality, 
susceptible to more precise definition and open to varying 
constructions, and thus ambiguous in the relevant sense. Chevron 
deference, however, is not accorded merely because the statute is 
ambiguous and an administrative official is involved. To begin 
with, the rule m ust be promulgated pursuant to authority 
Congress has delegated to the official. The Attorney General has 
rulemaking power to fulfill his duties under the CSA. The specific 
respects in which he is authorized to make rules, however, instruct 
us tha t he is not authorized to make a  rule declaring illegitimate a 
medical standard for care and treatm ent of patients that is 
specifically authorized under state law. (000 U.S. 04-623).
Make no mistake about it; the CSA very much limits the power of the
Attorney General. “Congress did not delegate to the Attorney General
authority to carry out or effect all provisions of the CSA. Rather, he can
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promulgate rules relating only to ‘registration’ and ‘control,’ and ‘for the 
efficient execution of his functions’under the statute” (000 U.S. 04-623). 
It is within the realm of “registration” provision and its role in promoting 
“public interest” tha t the Attorney General stated it could revoke 
physicians’ licenses. “In determining consistency with the public 
interest, the Attorney General must...consider five factors, including: the 
State's recommendation; compliance with state, federal, and local laws 
regarding controlled substances; and public health and safety.”
However, Ashcroft failed to consider these factors and goes a  step further 
declaring, “that using controlled substances for physician-assisted 
suicide is a  crime, an authority that goes well beyond the Attorney 
General's statutory power to register or deregister.”
Furthermore, under the CSA, “the statute permits the Attorney 
General to add, remove, or reschedule substances. He may do so, 
however, only after making particular findings, and on scientific and 
medical matters he is required to accept the findings of the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (Secretary). These proceedings m ust be on 
the record after an opportunity for comment” (000 U.S. 04-623). Before 
issuing the Interpretive Rule, Ashcroft made no contact with Secretary 
and instead only relied on “the recommendation of the Office of Legal 
Counsel in the Department of Justice” (Bloustein and Sachs 2006). 
Indeed, it is very possible tha t Ashcroft hastily issued the directive as “he 
opposed physician-assisted suicide as a  senator” (Mauro 2006) for years.
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Indeed, “CSA allocates decision-making powers among statutory actors 
so that medical judgments, if they are to be decided at the federal level 
and for the limited objects of the statute, are placed in the hands of the 
Secretary...The structure of the CSA, then, conveys unwillingness to cede 
medical judgments to an Executive official who lacks medical expertise” 
(000 U.S. 04-623). Ashcroft possessed little medical expertise.
Moreover, when the CSA extended its regulatory power to anabolic 
steroids in 1990 “it relied not on Executive ingenuity, bu t ra ther on 
specific legislation” (000 U.S. 04-623). From a  legal perspective, the 
Interpretive Rule specifically notes that physician-assisted suicide has no 
“legitimate medical purpose” and such implies “medical judgm ents” on 
which Ashcroft did not base his Rule on. “This confirms th a t the 
authority claimed by the Attorney General is both beyond his expertise 
and incongruous with the statutory purposes and design” (000 U.S. 04- 
623).
The CSA’s “statutory purposes [are] to combat drug abuse and 
prevent illicit drug trafficking” (000 U.S. 04-623). Again, physician- 
assisted suicide does not involve either criterion. Solicitor General Paul 
Clement argued, “doctor-assisted suicide has a  tendency to ‘debilitate 
lives’ju st as much as drug abuse, which is what The CSA primarily 
targeted” (Bloustein and Sachs 2006). However, Justices O’Connor and 
Souter noted that such reasoning would include “lethal injection death 
penalties” (Bloustein and Sachs 2006) into the CSA. Justice Breyer
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commented on the intent of the CSA asserting, “Congress didn’t think 
about the death penalty, and it didn’t  think of assisted suicide” (Alderson 
Reporting Company, 2006, 8). Thus, “the statute and our case law 
amply support the conclusion that Congress regulates medical practice 
insofar as it bars doctors from using their prescription-writing powers as 
a  means to engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking as conventionally 
understood. Beyond this, however, the statute manifests no intent to 
regulate the practice of medicine generally” (000 U.S. 04-623). In Raich, 
the Court was dealing with marijuana, which “has been determined by 
Congress to have no legitimate uses, while the controlled substances 
used in assisted suicide do have proper medical uses” (Smith 2005). 
There was a clear connection between m arijuana and potential abuse 
and trafficking tha t was not present here.
Moreover, “regulation of health and safety is ‘primarily, and 
historically, a matter of local concern”’ (000 U.S. 04-623). It is an area of 
federalism that historically was delegated to the states. During the oral 
arguments. Justice Souter specifically stated “that Congress intended to 
retain and respect the historic powers of the States to define legitimate 
medical practices” (Alderson Reporting Company 2006, 56). The people 
of the state of Oregon chose to enact the law and thus, it is totally within 
their power. Although Justice O’Connor did not file a  concurring 
opinion, it is possible to assum e her stance is very m uch an extension of 
her dissent in Raich. “[Raich] exemplifies the role of States as
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laboratories. The States' core police powers have always included 
authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of their citizens” (000 U.S. 03-1454). Oregon is thus a laboratory 
for the issue of assisted suicide.
Kennedy also noted that the CSA explicitly includes a role for states. 
Not only does the Attorney General have to pay heed to the state's 
recommendation and compliance with state and local laws regarding 
controlled substances, but the CSA includes a pre-emption provision 
which states.
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an 
intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that 
provision operates . . .  to the exclusion of any State law on the 
same subject m atter which would otherwise be within the 
authority of the State, unless there is a  positive conflict between 
tha t provision . . . and that State law so that the two cannot 
consistently stand together (000 U.S. 04-623).
Thus, including states is veiy much evident in the process and was 
disregarded by Ashcroft. In sum, “the text and structure of the CSA 
show that Congress did not have this far-reaching intent to alter the 
federal-state balance and the congressional role in maintaining it” (000 
U.S. 04-623).
Justices Scalia and Thomas filed dissenting opinions. Scafia argued, 
“the most reasonable interpretation of the regulation and of the statute 
would produce the same result. Virtually every relevant source of 
authoritative meaning confirms that the phrase legitimate medical 
purpose’ does not include intentionally assisting suicide” (000 U.S. 04-
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623). He rested his argument on the fact that medicine is to produce
health, while death obviously does not. He further stated,
Prohibition or deterrence of assisted suicide is certainly not among 
the enumerated powers conferred on the United States by the 
Constitution, and it is within the realm of public morality (bonos 
mores) traditionally addressed by the so-called police power of the 
States. But then, neither is prohibiting the recreational use of 
drugs or discouraging drug addiction among the enum erated 
powers. From an early time in our national history, the Federal 
Government has used its enumerated powers, such as its power to 
regulate interstate commerce, for the purpose of protecting public 
morality...Unless we are to repudiate a long and well-established 
principle of our jurisprudence, using the federal commerce power 
to prevent assisted suicide is unquestionably permissible (000 U.S. 
04-623).
Such reasoning is in direct correlation with his concurring opinion in 
Raich where a comprehensive scheme was present, as it was here, since 
it is the same act, the CSA, and as such, the federal government can 
interfere in intrastate activity.
Justice Thomas made no argument supporting his dissent, bu t rather 
he scolded the majority for “rest[ing] upon constitutional principles that 
[they] rejected in Raich” (000 U.S. 04-623). Nevertheless, by saying the 
principle in Raich should be extended, he is doing the same thing and 
reversing his own opinion. In fact, “Thomas justified his vote based on a 
technicality: during oral argument, the lawyer for Oregon said he w asn’t 
asking the Court to overturn its Commerce Clause precedents and, 
Thomas says, he took the lawyer at his word” (Moller 2006). Thomas 
concluded, “the scope of the CSA and the Attorney General's power 
thereunder are sweeping, and perhaps troubling, such expansive federal
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legislation and broad grants of authority to administrative agencies are 
merely the inevitable and inexorable consequence of this Court's 
Commerce Clause and separation-of-powers jurisprudence” (000 U.S. 04- 
623). Thus, Thomas is advocating cooperative federalism.
Gonzales v. Oregon represents another instance of the Rehnquist 
Court limiting the excesses of federal power. However, what was most 
interesting is that the victory was courtesy of the liberal bloc of justices. 
The Court upheld a sta te’s right to operate outside the realm of federal 
legislation, thus making it autonomous in its own sphere. Moreover, it 
restricted an expansive view of federal powers and instead cited the 
state’s traditional power to regulate medical practice. Perhaps most 
amazing is, “neither side even mentioned the Constitution’s 
Amendment” (Kilpatrick 2006, IIB). Certainly, the issue of assisted 
suicide is nowhere enumerated in the Constitution and as such by the 
power of the Tenth Amendment m ust be a  power reserved to the states. 
Based on that criterion alone, Oregon should have won. Nevertheless, no 
one bothered to mention this obvious oversight. Again, in Oregon, the 
liberal justices were guided by precedent in examining the Interpretive 
Rule, but also by Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) where they “ultimately 
upheld a state ban on assisted suicide, [but] it left the issue to the 
states” (Lucas 2005).
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Thus, the Rehnquist Court again applied its rational-basis review and 
established that this area of federal expansion was too far-reaching and 
thus curbed its excess.
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CHAPTER 7
THE STATE OF FEDERALISM 
The issue of federalism is one of param ount importance in American 
history. The federalism debate is as old the nation itself. From the end 
of the Revolutionary War to 1787, the country was mired in depression 
and inefficiency due to the government established under the Articles of 
Confederation. That government relied upon states’ rights and was 
foundering. Then we reevaluated the federalist system. At what became 
known as the Constitutional Convention, the Framers created a 
centralized government. Yes, the states would retain some power, 
however, through such clear enum erations as the Necessary and Proper 
Clause and the Supremacy Clause, the federal government’s 
preeminence reigns supreme.
The Supreme Court has constantly varied on its interpretation on 
such issues as the Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, Eleventh 
Amendment, Supremacy Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Thus, they are key players in the federalism debate. The Marshall Court 
(1801-1835) operated under national supremacy, which does recognize 
states possess power, however, when conflict arises, the national 
government reigns supreme. The Taney Court (1835-1864) would alter
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this understanding and instead follow the dual federalism interpretation 
holding tha t the states and federal government remain autonomous in 
their own spheres. This lack of recognizing federal supremacy was the 
central issue tha t led to the American Civil War that divided the nation in 
two and cost 620,000 lives.
From 1865-1895 the Reconstruction Courts returned to national 
supremacy, but then the Court balanced itself representing “the 
judiciary’s attachm ent to traditional limits of legislative power” (Gillman 
1993, 15). These limits would last until 1937 when the post-New Deal 
Court would institute cooperative federalism as its interpretation of 
federalism and give the federal government exhaustive power. Although 
it would hit a few speed bumps in the 1970s and 1980s, it remained 
largely intact throughout the century and into the new millennium.
On the surface, Lopez appeared to transform the interpretation of 
federalism, however, it merely represents the point in which the Court 
stopped allowing the federal government free reign. These limitations as 
explored in the rational-basis review would further limit the excesses of 
federal power as it pertained to the Commerce Clause in Morrison and 
Oregon; and extended to the Fifth Amendment in Kelo\ Tenth 
Amendment in New York and Printz; the Eleventh Amendment in 
Seminole Tribe and Alden; and Fourteenth Amendment in Garrett. The 
Raich and Granholm decisions showed that the Court has no difficulty
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adhering to cooperative federalist principles that were established in the 
post-New Deal era.
Indeed, “the classic dilemma about federalism [is] we might like to 
empower vanguard states to experiment with bold, creative new policies, 
but we also fear the bad things states might do if they have autonomy” 
(Althouse 2005, 788). As for the justices themselves, we are left with a 
pretty clear picture. Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer are 
clear and constant proponents of coopérative federalism, bu t recognize 
there are certain issues tha t are state issues as evidenced in Oregon.
The conservative bloc of Roberts, Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy likewise 
believe in cooperative federalism, bu t are more apt to limit its excesses. 
Indeed, none of the recent cases explored repudiate the core of Wickard. 
As of January  31, 2006, Sandra Day O'Connor was replaced with Samuel 
Alito. His swing vote could determine the future of federalism for years 
to come.
In May 2006, the Court had the potential to further define its 
federalism interpretation in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno. However, the Court 
sidestepped the question of interpreting the Commerce Clause and 
instead dismissed the case on the grounds tha t the plaintiffs did not 
have standing to sue. Nevertheless, its Commerce Clause interpretation 
will emerge again in the combined cases of Rapanos v. United States and 
Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps o f Engineers tha t were argued before the
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Court on February 21, 2006. However, one thing remains likely is that 
the debate will continue to rage on until the end of this union.
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